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COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special @den&$

Fund

("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 1

Law Offices, pursuant to J.R.P. Rule 15, and hereby petitions the Idaho Industrial
Commission for a declaratory ruling and states as follows:
I.

Petitioner ISIF ("Petitioners")

hereby petition the Commission for a

declaratory ruling regarding the construction, validity or applicability of a
prior Lump Sum Settlement Agreement entered into between Petitioner and
Claimant on the right of Claimant to maintain the current action against
Petitioner.
2.

Petitioner hereby alleges an actual controversy exists over the construction,
validity or applicability of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue
pursuant to the following:
a.

Claimant filed Complaints against Employer Valley Vista Care Corp.,
surety State Insurance Fund and Defendant ISIF (LC. 90-702141) in 1991,
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits for injuries
sustained on June 28, 1990.

b. On or about February 18, 1994, Claimant entered into a Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement with a11 the parties to that action. Under the
Agreement, Claimant agreed to receive $6,500 in consideration for and in
payment of any and all claims that Claimant may have had at the time of
the Agreement or other claims Claimant could thereafter make for benefits
against ISIF under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho.
The Commission approved that agreement on or about February 8, 1994.
c. Claimant filed the current Complaint against Petitioners on April 26,2006,
in connection with a new industrial accident. Petitioners filed an Answer

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 2

, denying that Petitioner is entitled to receive any

on

worker's compensation benefits in connection with injuries associated
with the claimed accident, as Claimant has waived andlor is collaterally
estopped from bringing new worker's compensation claims against ISIF
by virtue of the terms of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue.
d. Petitioners deny that they may be held liable for the payment of worker's
compensation benefits to Claimant in this case since Claimant agreed that
the earlier settlement fully, finally and forever discharged and released
Petitioner form any and all future liability on account of Claimant.

3.

Petitioner further alleges that they have an economic interest which is directly
affected by Claimant's failure to abide by the terms of the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement at issue.

4.

Petitioners' Petition for Declaratory Ruling is supported by the attached
Memorandum and Affidavit of Verlene Wise filed contemporaneously
herewith.

/Z-

DATED this -day of May, 2006.
MALLEA LAW OFFICES

genneth L. Mallea
Attorney for DefendantIISIF

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 3
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2006, a hue and correct
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Charles L. Graham
c/o Landeck Westberg
PO Box 9344
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Mark T. Monson
PO Box 8456
Moscow. Idaho 83843
b
b
b

by U.S. mail
y hand delivery
y facsimile
y overnight mail

Mallea

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 4

Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
7 8 SW 51h Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, Idaho 83680
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
Facsimile: (208) 888-2789
Idaho State Bar No. 2397
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATSY WERNECKE,

1

Claimant,

AFFIDAVIT OF VEIXLENE WISE

VS.

ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 41,

I
/

Employer,

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

I

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

1
:ss

County of Ada

NO. 03-515254

1

AFFIDAVIT OF VERLENE WISE - 1

VERLENE WISE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am the Insurance Claims Technical Advisor for Defendant, State of Idaho, Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"), in the above-entitled action. I make this affidavit based upon
the files and records maintained by the ISIF and upon my personal knowledge.
2. I have been the ISIF's Insurance Claims Technical Advisor for three years.

3. In the past twenty-eight (28) years, the ISIF has entered into over 1,045 Lump Sum
SettlementAgreements (LSSAs) or other compensation agreements. Records prior to 1977 are not
computerized or easily accessible and consequently are not included in this affidavit. Between 1977
and May of 2006, the Commission has duly entered its approval and order in each case where a
LSSA was utilized, resulting in a final and binding resolution of the pending case.
4. Attached hereto, as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement executed on or about February 18,1994, between Claimant and ISIF, including the Order
of Approval and of Discharge signed by the Idaho Industrial Commission.

5. In entering into the LSSA in 1994, the ISIF settled all present and potential or possible
future liability to the Claimant. The Claimant released the ISIF from all future liability
regardless of the then present or any future accidents or injuries. The Industrial Commission
approved said LSSA and duly entered its Order of Approval and Discharge thereon. Following
the Industrial Commission Order, the ISIF duly paid the decreed sum to the claimant

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

UA

&.

VERLENE WISE
AFFIDAVIT OF VERLENE WISE - 2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 1 7 ' ~day of May, 2006.

ding at Meridian, Idaho
commission expires: 8/16/06

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 7 ' ~day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:

Charles Graham
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
Mark T. Monson
P.O. Box 8456
Moscow, ID 83843

AFFIDAVIT OF VERLENE WISE - 3

&U.S.
Mail
[ ] Fax 384-5844
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Messenger Delivery

QUANE, SMITH, HOWARD & HULL
700 Ironwood Drive, Suite 301
P. 0. Box 1758
Coeur dfAlene, Idaho 83816-1758
Telephone: 664-9281
Attorneys for Defendant ISIF

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECXE,
Claimant,
I.C. 90-702141
VALLEY VISTA CARE
CORPORATION,
Employer,

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

I

I

1

IN CONSIDERATION of the premises and promises and
covenants hereinafter set forth, and subject to the above-entitled
CommissionfsApproval and Order of Discharge pursuant thereto, the
above-entitled parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
FIRST: As hereinafter referred to, the parties shall be
designated as follows:

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

-1

patsy Wernecke as Claimant, Industrial Special Indemnity
Fund as the Fund, and the Industrial Commission of the State of
Idaho as the Commission.
SECOND:

On June 28, 1990, Claimant was employed as a

nursers aide by Valley Vista Care Corporation, and on the same
date, Claimant allegedly incurred injuries resulting from an
industrial accident arising out of and in the course of employment
with Valley Vista Care Corporation.

These injuries include

herniated disc at C5-6 and C6-7 which resulted in a two level
anterior fusion on January 24, 1991.
THIRD:

Claimant contends, and the Fund denies, that

claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and
that the Fund is liable for a portion of Claimant's disability due
to preexisting conditions.
FOURTH:

It is the contention of the Fund that there are

..disputesconcerning: (1) whether Claimant suffered injuries as a
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment on June 28, 1990; (2) whether Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled; (3) whether Claimant has a pre-existing
permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Section 72-332
Idaho Code;

(4)

if Claimant has a pre-existing physical impairment,

whether said pre-existing impairment was manifest and constituted

a hindrance or obstacle to Claimant obtaining employment; (5)
whether in the event Claimant is totally and permanently disabled,
Claimant has pre-existing impairments within the meaning of Section
72-332, Idaho code, which contributed to said disability; (6) the
extent of apportionment of liability for benefits between Defendant

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

-
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employer/surety and the Fund pursuant to Section 72-332, Idaho
Code, in the event liability is assessed against the Fund.
The parties hereto acknowledge that there are serious
questions and, therefore, disputes concerningthe above issues. ~t
is further acknowledged that this lump sum settlement is a
compromise settlement of said issues as well as all other issues
whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated
by the parties.
Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the
commission by duly serving the Fund with appropriate pleadings, the
timeliness and sufficiency as to form of said filings being
conceded by the Fund.
In consideration of this agreement, all parties stipulate
that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be deemed to
adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Workers1
Compensation Laws of Idaho.
FIFTH: Claimant was born on

. At the time

of the alleged accident, Claimant was a resident of Fernwood,
Idaho.

Claimant was earning $4.51 per hour as a nurse's

aide.

Claimant is currently unemployed and resides in Fernwood, Idaho.
SIXTH: Following the 1990 accident, Claimant was treated
by various physicians, whose reports are on file with the Commission. Claimant was examined by Dr. David Ashbaugh at the request
of the State Insurance Fund on April 28, 1992.

Dr. Ashbaugh

concluded that Claimant suffered a 20% permanent impairment rating
based upon chronic pain as a result of her industrial injury. On
October 13, 1992 Claimant was also examined by a panel of physi-

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
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cians at the request of the State Insurance Fund.

The panel

concluded that Claimant was capable of gainful employment on a
reasonably continuous basis with restrictions of no lifting over
thirty pounds or working overhead.

The panel concluded that

Claimant was stable and had an impairment rating of 16% of the
whole person.

Copies of these reports are attached.

SEVENTH: It is understood and agreed by and between the
parties hereto that the lump sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be
paid to Claimant by the Fund is in consideration for and in payment
of any and all claims that Claimant may now or hereafter have,
including but not limited to every claim of whatever nature or kind
for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary
disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and all
other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits
against the Fund under the Workerst Compensation Laws of the State
of Idaho.

This is the case whether or not the full extent of

Claimant's

damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now

known or foreseen, and regardless of whether the Claimant shall
ever again injure herself in another or future accident, or suffer
any disease which would arguably cause the Fund to be liable for
additional claims or benefits under the laws of the State of Idaho.
Acceptance of this agreement by the Claimant according to the terms
and conditions stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge
the Fund from liability from any claims forever, regardless of
whether such claims arise from the accident which is the subject of
this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments,

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 4

disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter
arisin-q.
...

. .,

EIGHTH:

In making this lump sum agreement and settle-

ment, all parties acknowledge and agree that the Fund does not
admit the allegations of Claimant, the same being solely for the
purpose of adjudication and settlement of a doubtful and disputed
claim.
NINTH:

It is in the best: interests of justice of the

parties hereto that the above-entitled claim be fully, finally and
forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump sum payment
by the Fund to Claimant in the amount of $6,500.00 within a
reasonable time following entry of Order of Discharge and approval

.

hereof .bythe Commiss.ion

TOTAL PERMr1NEEJT
DISABILITY ~BENEPTTS
:

Less attorney's fees and
costs payable by claimant
(from proceeds of lump sum
$1,500.00
settlement)
RECOVERY TO CLAIMANT:
TENTH:

$5,000.00

Claimant is represented herein and has been

counseled by James Westberg of Moscow, Idaho, whose name shall be
included as a payee on the respective settlement drafts to be
delivered to said attorney by the Fund. Attached as "Addendum A"
is an accounting from Claimant's attorney, James Westberg, setting
forth the information currently required by

the Industrial

conmission pursuant to the Commissionfs administrative rulings
under Section 72-803, Idaho Code.

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

-
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ELEVENTH: Upon Commission order approving this agreement
and excepting only payment of said consideration by the Fund, the
Fund shall be fully, finally and forever discharged and released of
and from any and all liability on account of the above Claimant.
TWELFTH:

The terms of this agreement shall be binding

upon all of the above-parties, their heirs, representatives,
successors and assigns.
THIRTEENTH:

The parties waive findings of

fact,

conclusions of law and the right of appeal or to reopen these
proceedings as part of the consideration of and for this agreement.
The parties hereto specifically and expressly agree, as
part of the consideration herein, that the parties waive the right
to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided under the
worker's compensation laws of Idaho, Section 72-718, Idaho Code.
FOURTEENTH: This agreement is made at Claimantlsrequest
and is the acceptance of offer by the Fund.

By this instrument,

Claimant requests Commission approval hereof and Order of Discharge
pursuant hereto; and the Fund joins in said petition and stipulates
that it shall be granted.

Claimant acknowledges that he has

carefully read this agreement and legal instrument in its entirety,
understands its contents and has executed the same knowing that
this agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of
any and all claims of every kind and character he has or may have
against the Fund, and that these proceedings are concluded and
forever closed by reason hereof, subject only to Commission
approval and order, as aforesaid.

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

-
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FIFTEENTH:

All portions of this instrument constitute

binding covenants of the parties, and no portion is a mere recital.

cke
STATE OF IDAHO

1

county of

)
)

ss.

On this lao,day of February, 1994, before me, the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
appeared PATSY WERNECKE, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed my official seal, the
day and year first above written.
n

(SEAL)
APPROVED :

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT
The foregoing stipulation agreement and petition having
duly and regularly come before this Commission and appearing that
the interests of justice and of the Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, are
and will be served by approving said agreement and granting the
order of Discharge as prayed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement
shall be, and the same hereby is, APPROVED; and further,
Said petition shall be and hereby is GRANTED, and the
above-entitled proceedings against the Fund are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
DATED this

& day of Febryary, 1994.

Assistant Secretary

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

-
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Kenneth L. Mallca
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 S.W. 5"' Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
Fax: (208) 888-2789
Idaho State Bar No. 2397
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant.
VS.

ST. MAIUES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 41,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. 15

Employer,
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea
Law Offices, and submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Petition for

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETlTON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1

Declaratory Ruling.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1991, Claimant filed a Complaint for the entitlement of worker's compensation
benefits against her employer, Valley Vista Care Corp., its surety, State Insurance fund,
and ISIF, in connection with injuries she sustained resulting from an industrial accident
arising out of her employment as a nurse's aide with Valley Vista Care. See Affidavit of
Verlene Wise, Exh. A. In the course of that action, disputes arose among the parties
concerning the issues of whether, among other things, Claimant was totally and
permanently disabled, whether Claimant had a pre-existing physical impairment and
whether Claimant actually suffered injuries as a result of the claimed accident. Id.
On or about February 18, 1994, the parties entered into a Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement. Id. Under the Settlement, the parties agreed that $6,500 would be paid to
Claimant and that Claimant, in consideration thereof, would release ISIF from any claims
that Claimant had against ISIF at the time of the Agreement and any claims she may have
in the future against ISIF. Id. The text of the Agreement specifically provides:
..the lump sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be paid to Claimant by the
Fund is in consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that
Claimant may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every
claim of whatever nature or kind for medical expenses, prescriptions,
psychiatric care, temporary disability compensation, permanent disability
compensation and all other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter
make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's Compensation
Laws of the State of Idaho. This is the case whether or not the full extent
of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now known
or foreseen, and regardless of whether the Claimant shall ever again injure
herself in another or future accident, or suffer any disease which would
arguably cause the Fund to be liable for additional claims or benefits under
the laws of the State of Idaho.
Acceptance of this agreement by Claimant according to the terms and
conditions stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge the Fund

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 2

from liability from any claims forever, regardless of whether such claims
arise from the accident which is the subject of this cause, or any accidents,
injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or deformities existing prior
thereto or hereafter arising.
Id. at pp. 4-5.
In the Agreement, Claimant also acknowledged that she had carefully read the
contents of the Agreement, understood it and executed it knowing that it forever
concluded and finally disposed of any claims of every kind and character that she had at
the time or may have in the future against ISIF. Id. at p. 6. The Commission approved of
the settlement and issued an Order of Discharge on or about February 8, 1994. Id. at p. 8.
Claimant filed tbe current action against the ISIF on April 26, 2006.

See

Complaint. Claimant alleges that, while working and cleaning tables for the school, she
sustained injury to her right shoulder when the leg of a table she was moving fell off and
the table dropped. Id. The injury allegedly occurred as Claimant caught the table and
took its full weight. Id. Claimant asserts that her injuries and preexisting conditions,
including chronic back pain, cholecystectomy, repair of patellar fracture right,
bursectomy of prepatellar bursa left and neck fusion renders her totally and permanently
disabled.

11. ARGUMENT
A. CLAIhlAST'S COJ1PI.AINT ACiAJIT ISIF IS BARKED PUKSUAST-T-Q
THF DOCTIUII: COLLATEMI, ESTOPI'EL.
The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel necessarily operates to bar
the Claimant from pursuing ISIF for liability for benefits in this case. In the prior suit
between the Claimant and ISIF, Claimant completely and voluntarily released ISIF from
liability for any and all claims, even if Claimant injured herself again in the future. Thus,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 3

the Claimant should now be barred from asserting, in a new action against ISIF, that ISIF
is liable for the payment of benefits in connection with injuries allegedly sustained in the
industrial accident claimed in the Complaint. The issue of whether Claimant could ever
assert liability against ISIF as to a future accidentiinjury was conclusively decided in the
earlier case.
In Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993),
the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the appropriate test for determining whether collateral
estoppel (or issue preclusion) will prevent a litigant from relitigating issues decided in a
prior case:
(1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is asserted ... have a
'full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?"' (2) Was
the issue decided in the prior litigation "identical with the one presented in
the action in question?" (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior
litigation? This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was
"necessary to [the prior] judgment." (4) "Was there a final judgment on
the merits?'(5) "Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?".

Id. at 439, 849 P.2d at 112. Collateral estoppel operates to bind a party even on issues
not expressly resolved in the prior suit, if the resolution of such issues can be necessarily
or inevitably inferred. Pocatello Zndus. Park Co. v. Steel W., 101 Idaho 783, 788, 621
P.2d 399,404 (Idaho 1980).
Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful
to restate the doctrine and identify the values which it serves. Under the judiciallydeveloped doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law
necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a
different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Collateral estoppel, like
the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of
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multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions,
encourage reliance on adjudication." [Footnote and citations omitted.] United States v.

Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158, 104 S.Ct. 568,571,78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984), quotingAllen v.
McCury, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-15, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Accord
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1987).
There is ample authority for the proposition that the Claimant should be barred
from pursuing ISIF for the payment of benefits in this case after having agreed to release
ISIF from any and all liability in regards to any future injury or occurrence. Initially, it
should be noted that Commission approval of a lump sum agreement constitutes a final
judgment on the merits of a claim. Jackman v. Z~ldusfrialSpecial Zrzdeinitity Fund, 129
Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). Moreover, there is little question that the issue as to
ISIF's future liability on account of Claimant was hlly and fairly litigated and actually
decided in the prior lawsuit, as evidenced by the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement.
Courts around the country have agreed that a claimant may properly release and
waive future workman's compensation claims against a defendant in the course of a
settlement agreement. See, e.g., Moore v. Campbell, Wyatt & Cannon Foundy, 142
Mich. App. 363, 369 N.W.2d 904 (1985) (Claimant signed a broadly-worded redemption
agreement releasing the employer and carrier from liability for any other injuries which
may occur during his employment and, thus, four years later when claimant petitioned for
benefits for silicosis, the court held that the petition was barred by the agreement); Gates

Rubber Co. v. Cantrell, 678 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1996) (settlement agreement between the
claimant and the employer releasing the employer from all future claims barred a later
action for retaliatory discharge).
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Certainly, a compensation agreement between the claimant and defendant(s) is
final only as to those matters actually included in the agreement. See Woodvine v.

Triangle Daivy, Znc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984). Further, to the extent the
agreement is ambiguous on an issue sought to be later estopped from litigation, collateral
estoppel may not apply to bar a future action, as a court may find that the issue was not
actually decided. Hawkes v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 2001 M E 8, 764 A.2d 258
(2001)

. "Unless a worker's

compensation settlement agreement explicitly waives the

right of the claimant to bring another type of claim against the insurer or the employer,
such a waiver will not be implied in the absence of evidence of the intent of the parties at
the time of contracting to create the waiver." Id. at 267.
Here, there was no ambiguity in the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue.
Claimant explicitly and fully discharged ISIF from liability from any and all claims
forever, including claims related to a future injurylaccident not related to those raised in
the litigation from which the Agreement was based. Claimant fully understood that the
agreement forever concluded and disposed of all claims of any kind that she may have in
the future against ISIF. The Commission, upon reviewing the Agreement to determine if
it was in the best interests of Claimant, entered an order approving the settlement.
Therefore, the issue of whether Claimant was barred from ever bringing a claim
against ISIF in regards to a future accidentlinjury was fully litigated and actually decided.
The Order approving the settlement and discharging the parties of liability had the effect
of a final judgment on the merits. Claimant should be barred from attempting to relitigate this issue against ISIF in this action by attempting to assert claims for liability
against ISIF in contravention of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement.
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B. CLAIMANT'S COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF IS BARRED PURSUANT TO
THE DOCTRTNE OF RES JUDICATA.
The application of the doctrine of res judicata also demands that the Claimant he
prevented from pursuing ISIF for liability for benefits in this case.

Claimant is

attempting to once again litigate the same claim as in the prior suit - her right to worker's
compensation benefits - when that claim was fully adjudicated and concluded with a
final judgment barring Claimant from asserting any future liability against the ISIF. The
doctrine of res judicata generally demands that, in an action between the same parties
upon the same claim or demand, "the former adjudication concludes parties and privies
not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as
to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Diamond v.

Farmers Group, 119 Idaho 146, 148,804 P.2d 319,321 (1990).
The law of res judicata reflects an expectation that parties who are given the
capacity and opportunity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact do so. Thus, a
valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of a party or disposing of a claim bars
another action by the plaintiff on the same claim. Id. With regard to the interpretation of
the phrase "same claim or demand," Idaho has adopted the position of The Restatement
(Second), Section 24, which provides:
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
plaintiffs claim . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of
the transaction . . . out of which the action arose.
(emphasis added); See Diamond, 119 Idaho at 148. Comment (a) to Section 24 further
explains the concept of a "claim" by stating that the present trend is to "see claim in
factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of
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substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be
available to the plaintiff."
Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals provided guidance as to the correct
application of the doctrine of res judicata when it stated:
"Claim preclusion," or true res judicata ... treats a judgment, once
rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same
parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action.". . . When the pIaintiff
obtains a judgment in his favor, his claim "merges" in the judgment; he
may seek no further relief on that claim in a separate action. Conversely,
when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the plaintiffs claim is
extinguished; the judgment then acts as a "bar." ... Under these rules of
claim preclusion, the effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all
issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not
raised at trial.

Hindmarsh v. Mock, 2001 Ida. App. LEXIS 113, 6-7 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). The
application of this doctrine in cases in front of the Industrial Commission is only
modified and tempered by the requirement that a decision by the Industrial Commission
has res judicata effect only for those issues the Commission actuallv decides. See

Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 2005 Ida. LEXIS 118, 121 P.3d 938 (2005).
There can be little doubt that the Claimant is once again trying to re-litigate the
same claim that had been extinguished in a prior suit - her right to compensation for an
industrial injury. In the prior adjudication, the effect of the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement was an adjudication of all worker's compensation claims that Claimant had
against ISIF at that time or may have had in the future. The Commission necessarily
decided the issue of Claimant's rights to present and future worker's compensation
benefits during that case when it approved the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and
dismissed the case.
Clearly, Claimant cannot seek further relief under a claim for worker's
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compensation benefits in this action when that claim was completely extinguished and
final judgment rendered in connection with the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement in
1994. That judgment acts as a bar to Claimant's right to pursue the same claim

- the

right to recover worker's compensation benefits as a result of an industrial accident - in
this proceeding. Therefore, Claimant's suit against ISIF should be dismissed.

C. CLAIMANT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR
LIABILITY AGAINST ISIF BASED ON A FUTURE INJURY. THE
COMMISSION SHOULD ESTOP CLAIMANT FROM PROCEEDING
AGAINST ISIF IN THIS ACTION.
It is undisputed that Claimant had the opportunity to review the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement in the prior case, discuss its implications with counsel and
executed it with full knowledge of its implications and her rights in regards to being able
to assert future claims against ISIF of any type. Claimant was under no obligation to sign
the Agreement. She voluntarily gave up the right to pursue ISIF for liability in any future
worker's compensation claim in consideration for settlement of her 1991 claim.
WAIVER:
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage.

Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 432 (1981). "It is a voluntary act
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some
right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have demanded and
insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff; 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956). "Waiver arising
out of conduct is in the nature of estoppel." Idaho Bank of Commerce v. Chastain, 86
Idaho 146, 383 P.2d 849 (1963). It is an equitable doctrine based upon fairness and
justice and, in order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear,
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although it may be established by conduct. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining
Co., 122 Idaho 778,782,839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992).
Claimant cannot reasonably argue that she was not fully aware that she was
waiving the possibility of asserting any future claim against ISIF of any type when she
signed the Agreement. She voluntarily and intentionally relinquished her right to assert
such future liability.

Certainly, there is no statutoly language in the workers'

compensation law or prior Idaho case law preventing parties to a worker's compensation
suit from entering into settlement agreements barring a claimant from asserting any future
claims against a defendant. As long as the agreement is clear and unambiguous and the
evidence provides that the claimant clearly intended to waive such a right, the Agreement
should be upheld and applied.

Therefore, by application of waiver, Claimant's

Complaint against ISIF should be dismissed.
ESTOPPEL:
In the alternative, the Commission should conclude that the Claimant should be
estopped from seeking benefits from ISIF.

. . .The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of
benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The
doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to
maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of
which he accepted a benefit. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,281,
486 P.2d 992,994 (1971). The act of the party against whom the estoppel
is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some
disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel must have
been induced to change his position. Id., 94 Idaho at 281,486 P.2d at 994
(citations omitted). (emphasis added).
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel does not require a false representation. It is designed to
prevent a party from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by
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changing positions. Young v. Idaho Department of Law Enforcement, Alcohol Beverage

Control Division, 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615 (Ct.App. 1993). "The doctrine of
quasi-estoppel may be invoked against a person asserting a right inconsistent with a
position previously taken by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the
detriment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine." (citation omitted). Young, 123
Idaho at 875.
Claimant's complaint for payment of benefits against ISIF asserts a position that
is inconsistent with the position previously taken by Claimant in the prior action with
ISIF. Claimant had knowledge and a complete understanding of the fact that signing the
Agreement was her acceptance of a lump sum payment of $6,500 in consideration for
releasing ISIF of any future claims which Claimant may have had in the future against
the Fund. Now Claimant bas attempted to take the inconsistent position that the prior
Agreement does not operate to bar her current claim against ISIF, which position clearly
prejudices and disadvantages the Fund. Claimant gained the benefit of receiving the
lump sum payment and it would be unconscionable to allow Claimant to maintain the
position that she may now assert claims against ISIF in contravention of her earlier
position when signing the Agreement.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Commission should estop Claimant
from seeking benefits from ISIF and dismiss Claimant's complaint.

111. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, ISIF respectfully requests that the Commission
issue a declaratory ruling in accordance with the arguments set forth above and dismiss
with prejudice the Claimant's complaint against ISIF.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 11

&

DATED t h i s o d a y of May, 2006.
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
/I

/ZLi Y ~ A
~ 6 n n e t hL. Mallea
Attorney for DefendantlISIF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 7
ay of May, 2006, a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Charles L. Graham
c/o Landeck Westberg
PO Box 9344
Moscow. Idaho 83843
Mark T. Monson
PO Box 8456
Moscow, Idaho 83843

XX by U.S. mail
by hand delivery
by facsimile
by overnight mail

ks/
c-%a
enneth L. Mallea
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM
LANDECK, W'ESTBERG, JUDGE & G W A M . P.A.
P.O. Box 9344
414 S. Jefferson
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593

Attorneys for Claimant
Idaho Bar No. 3839
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant,
vs.
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT No. 41,

)

1

1

LC. No. 03-5 15254

)

MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE
TO PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

1
1
)

1
Employer,

)
)

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Swety,

anh

)
)
)

1
)

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY F W D ,

j

1
1

Defendants.
)

Claimant, Patsy Wemecke, by and through her attorney, Charles L. Graham of the firm

Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A.. hereby moves the Industrial Commission, pursuant
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1

CHARLES L. GRAHAM
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.
P.O. Box 9344
414 S. Jefferson
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Claimant
Idaho Bar No. 3839
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 03-515254

1
VS.

ST. MANES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT No. 41,

)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE
TO PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

1
1
1
1

and

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

1
1

Surety,

Defendants.
Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, by and through her attorney, Charles L. Graham of the firm
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby moves the Industrial Commission, pursuant
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1

J.R.P. 15.e. for extension of the time for filing Claimant's response to the Petition for
Declaratory Ruling filed in this action by the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund.
This motion is made on the grounds that Claimant's counsel, Charles Graham, will be out
of the country from May 25,2006 through June 7,2006 and is unable to prepare and submit a
written response to the Petition within the time allowed. Mr. Graham's affidavit is filed
herewith
Claimant respectfully requests that the time for filing of her written response be extended
to June 2 1,2006.
84

Dated this

day of May, 2006.
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.

By:
Charles L. Graham
Attorneys for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

2q

4,

day of May, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy

of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner
indicated below:
Ken Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
PO Box 857
Meridian ID 83680

X ] U.S. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789
[
] Hand Delivery

Mark Monson
Mosman Law Offices
PO Box 8456
Moscow ID 83843

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ X ] Fax - 208-882-0589
[ ] Hand Delivery

c-L~+L

Charles L. Graham
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Claimant,
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DISTRICT No. 41,
Employer,
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AFFIDAVIT OF
CHARLES L. GRAHAM
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STATE OF IDAHO,INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

)
)
)

Defendants.
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.
P.O. Box 9344
414 S. Jefferson
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Claimant
Idaho Bar No. 3839
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant,

1
>
1

VS.
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DISTRICT No. 41,
Employer,

1
1
1
1
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and

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
and
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STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
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I.C. No. 03-515254
AFFIDAVIT OF
CHARLES L. GRAHAM

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Latah

1

Charles L. Graham, being first duly sworn, states of his personal knowledge as follows:

1. I am the attorney for Patsy Wemecke, Claimant, in IC No. 03-515254.
2. I received from the State of Idaho Special Indemnity Fund an Answer to Complaint
and Petition for Declaratory Ruling pursuant to J.R.P. 15. on May 19, 2006.

3. I have non-refundable airline tickets to Frankfurt, Germany on May 25, 2006,
returning June 7,2006. I am traveling to meet my son who is completing a term of service with
the Peace Corps in Turkmenistan. We have had the trip planned for almost a year.
4. I attempted to contact Kenneth Mallea, counsel for ISIF, to determine if he has any
objection to the extension of time. His office informed me he is out of the country until next
week.
5. I would greatly appreciate the Industrial Commission's accommodation of Claimant's
request for an extension of time for filing of Claimant's response to ISIF's petition.

&LU

Charles L. Graham

rbefore me t h i s z day of May, 2006.

O M -f . f

Notarv Public in and for thb State
of 1d&o, residing at m a3 C 0
My commission expires: , 0 / 2 S/'"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

U/

/f-

day of May, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy

of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner
indicated below:
Ken Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
PO Box 857
Meridian ID 83680

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789
[
] Hand Delivery

Mark Monson
Mosman Law Offices
PO Box 8456
Moscow ID 83843

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[ 1 Overnight Mail
[ X ] Fax - 208-882-0589
[ ] Hand Delivery

C.L. h

Charles L. Graham
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

d

PATSY W NECKE,
Claimant,

1
1
1
I

1

v.

IC 15-000083
(03-515254)

ST. MARIES JOLNT SCHOOL DIST. #41, )
Employer,

1
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,

ORDER GRANTING
EXTENSION OF TIME

) f
)
)
)

and

FILED

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,

1

MAY 2 6 2006

)
)

H%K1mA
jaP,FI*W'

Defendants.
On May 24, 2006, Claimant requested additional time in responding to the Petition for
Declaratory Ruling recently filed by Defendant Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). Claimant
supports her motion with an affidavit indicating that her attorney will be away from his office in a
foreign country from May 25, 2006 through June 7, 2006. The affidavit also indicates that her
attorney was unsuccessful in contacting the attorney for ISIF prior to filing this motion.
The Commission has fully reviewed the motion from Claimant and finds good cause for
granting the same. A response by ISIF will not be necessary in this matter.
Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of Time in filing the responsive brief to the Petition

-

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME 1

for Declaratory Ruling is hereby GRANTED. As a result, Claimant shall have until June 23,2006 in
which to file her brief in this matter.

&

DATED this &day

of May, 2006.
INDUSTRIAL. COMMISSION

Commissioner
ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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following persons:
CHARLES L GRAHAM
PO BOX 9344
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PO BOX 8456
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KENNETH L MALLEA
PO BOX 857
MERIDIAN ID 83680
cjh

-
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.
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FAX (208) 883-4593
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Idaho Bar No. 3839
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Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, by and through her attorney, Charles L. Graham of the firm
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., submits the following memorandum in response to the
Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed in this action by the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity
Fund.

I.

Introduction.

This case requires the Industrial Commission to determine the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund's ("ISIF") authority to enter into a lump sum agreement with a worker's
compensation claimant which attempts to absolve ISIF from liability for total and permanent
disability arising from a future injury to the claimant. Claimant Patsy Wernecke contends that
ISIF does not have such authority under Idaho's worker's compensation statutes, and further
contends that a lump sum agreement with ISIF which does not compensate the claimant for total
and permanent disability, and which bars the claimant from asserting a future claim for
compensation arising out of a future injury, is invalid and void as against the public policy of the
State of Idaho. Claimant recognizes that a declaratory ruling in her favor may upset longstanding precedent and fundamentally alter accepted practice; however, her case is a glaring
example of why the legislature could not have intended to allow ISIF to buy out of its statutory
obligation to compensate claimants for total and permanent disability in disputed cases.

11.

Statement of Facts.

Claimant Patsy Wemecke was first injured on June 28, 1990 while employed as a nurse's
aide. She herniated discs at two levels in her neck, resulting in a two level cervical fusion. She
filed a worker's compensation complaint against her employer, its surety State Insurance Fund,
and ISIF.
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Ms. Wernecke underwent two medical evaluations following her cervical fusion. Both
concluded that she was capable of lighter work. The first was at University of Washington
Harborview Medical Center. In a report dated April 30, 1992, David Ashbaugh, M.D.
determined that Ms. Wemecke "should be able to work at employment that does not involve
heavy lifting and use of her arms over her head for long periods." Affidavit of Charles L.
Graham, Exhibit A. The second evaluation, by Drs. Alan Alyea and Mark Holmes, occurred on
October 13,1992. It concluded that Ms. Wemecke should avoid lifiing over thirty pounds and
should avoid working overhead. Graham Affidavit, Exhibit B.
The surety paid PPI benefits for 16% whole person permanent partial impairment as a
result of the 1990 injury. Ms. Wemecke then settled her claim with the employer and surety for

an additional $30,000 (representing benefits for disability above impairment of 24.5% whole
person, future medical benefits, and lump sum consideration). See Graham Affidavit, Exhibit C.
Ms. Wernecke also settled her claim against ISIF, for $6,500. The Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement with ISlF ("Agreement") recites that "Claimant contends, and the Fund denies, that
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and that the Fund is liable
for a portion of the Claimant's disability due to pre-existing conditions." Graham Affidavit,
Exhibit D, p. 2 (emphasis added). Ms. Wernecke signed the Agreement and the Industrial
Commission approved it. She was represented by an attorney.
Ms. Wernecke returned to work as a custodian, within her restrictions, and was re-injured
on October 8,2002. She is now left with a five-pound lifting restriction with her right
(dominant) arm and contends that this restriction, when combined with a sitting limitation of 20
minutes and low language and math skills, renders her totally and permanently disabled under
the odd-lot doctrine. She has filed complaints against State Insurance Fund, surety at the time of
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the October 8,2002 injury, and against ISIF. ISIF denies liability, contending that the
Agreement approved by the Industrial Commission on February 8, 1994 bars any further claim
against ISIF under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and by waiver and quasiestoppel.

111.

Argument.
A. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement between claimant and ISIF is invalid
under Idaho Code $72-318(2) because it is an agreement by the employee to
waive her rights to compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act.
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is to provide "sure and certain relief for

injured workers and their families and dependents." Idaho Code 9 72-201 (1971); Davaz v.
Priest River Glass Co., I25 Idaho 333,337,870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). In line with this
fundamental purpose, the Act must be "liberally construed in favor of the claimant in order to
effect the object of the law and to promote justice." Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630,633,
115 P.3d 721,724 (2005), quoting Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955,793 P.2d
187 (1990). Neither the Court, nor by implication the Commission, can "deprive the statute of
its potency." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337.
Consistent with its purpose to protect injured workers and promote injustice, the
legislature enacted Idaho Code 8 72-3 18. This statute prohibits employers from requiring
employees to pay any portion of the employer's worker's compensation premium, to contribute
in any way to the cost or other security maintained by the employer for the purpose of securing
payment of worker's compensation benefits, to contribute to a benefit fund, or to participate in
any other device designed to relieve the employer from any liability created by the worker's
compensation statutes. An employer who deducts any amount from an employee's pay for any
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of these purposes is guilty of a misdemeanor. Idaho Code 9 72-318(1). The statute goes further,
however, and prohibits all agreements which attempt to deny or diminish an employee's right to
benefits. "No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this Act
shall be valid." Idaho Code 9 72-318(2) (emphasis added).
The question here is whether the lump sum settlement agreement between Ms. Wemecke
and ISIF constitutes an invalid agreement to waive her rights to compensation from the ISIF in
the event of total and permanent disability arising from a future injury.

1. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement is an invalid agreement to waive rights to
compensation.
By its terms, the Agreement relieves ISIF from any obligation to Ms. Wemecke on
account of any future injury. In paragraph SEVENTH, the Agreement provides that the lump
sum payment of $6,500 "is in consideration for and in payment of any and all claims the
claimant may now or hereafter have.. . and all other claims that Claimant could now or
hereafter make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the
State of Idaho. This is the case.. .whether the claimant shall ever again injure herself in another
or future accident.. .." (emphasis added). The Agreement further provides that claimant's
acceptance of the Agreement "shall fully and completely discharge the Fund from liability from
any claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the
subject of this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or
deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter arising." Agreement, pp. 4-5 (emphasis added).
ISIF asserts as the crux of its Petition that by signing the Agreement, Ms. Wemecke
"released ISIF from liability for any and all claims, even if Claimant injured herself again in
the future." ISIF Memorandum, p. 3. It both acknowledges Ms. Wemecke's attempt to waive
her right to seek benefits from ISIF arising from a future injury, and depends on this release in
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asserting that it can have no further liability. But it is precisely because the Agreement
forecloses any claim against ISIF arising out of a future injury that it is invalid under Idaho
Code $ 72-3 18(2).
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered the effect of Idaho Code $72-318(2) in
Emery v. J.R. Simplot Go., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005), where it addressed the Industrial

Commission's authority to approve a stipulation by the employer and employee to dismiss a
worker's compensation claim with prejudice under Idaho Code $ 72-508. The claimant
contended that the stipulation to dismiss with prejudice amounted to an invalid agreement to
waive his rights to compensation under Idaho Code 5 72-3 18(2). The Court disagreed. It held:
Emery was not waiving his rights to compensation under the act. He stipulated to
dismiss his claim with respect to the injury he suffered on March 10, 2001. The
stipulation did not relieve Simplot of liability for any injury he might suffer in
the future while employed by Simplot.
141 Idaho at 410.
The Agreement between Ms. Wernecke and ISIF is different. It specifically did relieve
ISIF of liability stemming from any injury Ms. Wernecke might suffer in the future. The
Agreement is expressly not limited to ISIF'S liability arising out of the June 28, 1990 accident
and it is therefore invalid.
Finally, the question whether Ms. Wernecke waived her right to compensation is
answered by ISIF's Memorandum. See Memorandum, pp. 9-10. ISIF contends that the evidence
shows that Ms. Wemecke "clearly intended to waive" her right to assert a claim against I S F
arising out of a future injury and that "by application of waiver, Claimant's Complaint against
ISIF should be dismissed." Id. p. 10. ISIF's assertion that "there is no statutory language in the
worker's compensation law or prior Idaho case law preventing parties to a worker's
compensation suit from entering into settlement agreements bamng a claimant from asserting
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any future claims against a defendant" id., is simply wrong. It is precisely the waiver which ISIF
asserts in defense of Ms. Wemecke's claim which renders her prior lump sum settlement
agreement with ISIF invalid and which establishes the right to bring her claim now.
2. The Agreement did not compensate Ms. Wernecke for total and permanent
disability.

Ms. Wemecke has a right to compensation against ISIF arising out of her October 8,
2002 injury if she can prove that she is now permanently and totally disabled. Idaho Code § 72332(1). With reference to the language of the statute, she is "an employee who has a permanent
physical impairment" who has "incur[red] a subsequent disability by an injury arising out of and
in the course of her employment, and by reason of both the combined effects of the pre-existing
impairment and subsequent injury", has suffered total and permanent disability. The employer
and surety are liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by her
most recent injury, and ISIF's obligation to pay the balance of benefits for total and permanent
disability is mandatory: she "shall be compensated for the remainder of [her] income benefits
out of the Industrial Special Indemnity Account." Idaho Code $ 72-332(1) (emphasis added).
ISIF cannot avoid this mandate by paying a de minimus amount in a lump sum settlement in
consideration for a waiver of future claims arising from future injuries. The Agreement cannot
be permitted to nullify or limit the operation of Idaho Code § 72-332. To do so would clearly
"deprive the statute of its potency." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337.

B. There is no statutory authority for ISIP to enter into agreements with claimants
settling claims where ISIP denies that it is liable for total and permanent disability.
ISIF was created by Idaho Code 72-323. In 72-324, ISJF's manager is granted power
to administer the fund, including the power to "make agreements, subject to the approval of the
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Industrial Commission, for compensation for injuries, and occupational diseases, in
accordance with the provisions of this act." Idaho Code 5 72-324 (emphasis added). Any
such agreement must provide compensation for injuries, not avoid the duty to compensate, and
must be consistent with law. The Act does not authorize ISIF to enter into, nor does it authorize
the Industrial Commission to approve, a lump sum payment abrogating ISIF's liability under

5 72-332.

Neither 5 72-404 nor 5 72-71 1 is to the contrary,

Section 72-404 provides for a lump sum payment whenever the Commission determines
that it is for the best interest of all parties that "the liability of the employer for
compensation.. .be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or more lump sums to
be determined, with the approval of the commission." Idaho Code 5 72-404 (emphasis added).
"Employer" is defined in Idaho Code 5 72-102(12)(a) as "any person who has expressly or
impliedly hired or contracted the services of another." ISIF is not an employer; it did not
expressly or impliedly hire Ms. Wernecke. It is therefore not authorized to discharge its liability
to Ms. Wernecke by lump sum payment under 5 72-404 and the Commission had no authority to
approve the payment.
In 5 72-1 11, relating to compensation agreements, the legislature likewise provided that
"if the employer and the afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation
under this law" a memorandum of the agreement is to be filed with the commission and
becomes enforceable under the provisions of 5 72-735. Such a compensation agreement "shall
be approved by the commission only when the terms conform to the provisions of this law."
Idaho Code 5 72-71 1 (emphasis added).
Again, ISIF is not an employer. Moreover, the compensation agreement between ISIF
and Ms. Wernecke does not conform to the provisions of the law. It violates 5 72-318(2), as set
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forth above. It also violates ISIF's obligation under 5 72-332 to compensate Ms. Wemecke for
those income benefits for which the employer and surety are not liable. ISIF cannot reasonably
argue that the $6,500 it paid to Ms. Wemecke was compensation for total and permanent
disability; ISIF specifically denied she was totally and permanently disabled and denied
disability for any portion of her disability due to pre-existing conditions. The $6,500 paid under
the Agreement represented only an additional 7% whole person disability at the time and
therefore constituted little more than consideration for the invalid waiver of Ms. Wernecke's
right to compensation from ISIF arising out of any future injury.
ISIF will likely argue that ISIF is statutorily authorized under Idaho Code 5 72-324 to
enter into agreements of the kind it made with Ms. Wemecke. While the manager may, and
routinely does, make agreements, subject to Industrial Commission approval, for compensation
for injuries in accordance with the provision of the worker's compensation laws, it is not
empowered to make agreements which relieve it from liability under 3 72-332. It is one thing to
enter into an agreement with a claimant whom ISIF acknowledges is totally and permanently
disabled, and which merely provides the method and structure for payment of benefits. It is quite
another matter, and contrary to law, for ISIF to buy out of its obligation under 5 72-332 for a
sum which comes nowhere close to compensating the claimant for total and permanent disability.
The Industrial Commission simply has no authority to approve such an agreement.

C. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Ms. Wernecke's
claim against ISIF.
1. Collateral estoppel.

The purposes of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, are to protect
litigants from the burden of re-litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy, to
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promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation, to prevent inconsistent decisions,
and to encourage reliance on adjudications. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604,617,114
P.3d 974, 987 (2005).
ISIF and Ms. Wemecke agree that collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of issues
necessarily decided as between these parties in Ms. Wemecke's prior action against ISIF. The
question is whether ISIF's liability with regard to future injuries was, or was even capable of,
being decided.
The Agreement itself is notably unhelpful. It simply states that in consideration of the
Agreement, "all parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be
deemed to adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Worker's Compensation Laws
of Idaho." Agreement p. 3. It further recites that the lump sum payment of $6,500 is "in
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that claimant may now or hereafter have,
including but not limited to.. .permanent disability compensation and all other claims a claimant
could now or hereafter make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's Compensation
Laws of the State of Idaho." Id., p. 4.
ISIF contends nonetheless that the Agreement "conclusively decided" whether Ms.
Wemecke could ever assert liability against ISIF as to a future injury, Memorandum, p. 4., and
asserts that Commission approval of the lump sum agreement constitutes a final judgment on the
merits of the claim. Id. However, it is clear that a future injury would necessarily involve a new
and separate claim with new facts, the merits of which could not possibly be decided by lump
sum settlement agreement or adjudication before the claim ever arose.
ISIF cannot credibly argue that the Agreement, and the Industrial Commission's approval
of it, constitute a final adjudication that Ms. Wemecke was totally and permanently disabled
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following the 1990 injury and that $6,500 fully compensated her for total and permanent
disability in excess of the impairment and disability paid by State Insurance Fund. To accord
collateral estoppel effect to the Agreement would be tantamount to finding that Ms. Wemecke
waived her right to compensation from ISIF to which she might be entitled as a result of a future
injury, a waiver barred by (j 72-318(2).

2. Res judicata.
Nor can the doctrine of res judicata apply. Idaho Code $72-718 provides, in relevant
part, that "a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as
to all matters adjudicated by the commission.. ." Idaho Code (j 72-718. According to the
Idaho Supreme Court, the statute alters the traditional understanding of res judicata:
We conclude that the legislature, by adding the phrase "as to all matters
adjudicated," intended that decisions of the Commission be final and conclusive
only as to those matters actually adjudicated. This is a departure from the
concept of "pure res judicata," applied prior to 1971, which accorded decisions by
the Commission finality and conclusiveness as to all matters which were, or could
have been, adjudicated. Therefore the ....compensation agreement is only final
and conclusive as to those matters actually considered by the Commission.
Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716,72 1,682 P.2d 1263 (1984). The

Commission did not actually adjudicate Ms. Wemecke's future injuries because those
injuries had not yet occurred. Ms. Wemecke is therefore not precluded from now
bringing her claims relating to a subsequent and different injury in 2002.
D. The common law doctrines of estoppel and waiver do not apply.
ISIF's common-law waiver defense is thoroughly discussed above. As for its contention
that the common law doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies because it would otherwise be
unconscionable to allow Ms. Wemecke to maintain that she is entitled to further compensation
from ISIF, this defense is without merit.
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First, it is not unconscionable to rely on a statute, $ 72-318(2), when that statute renders
the Agreement invalid. There is of course a purpose for this law. It recognizes that whether by
economic necessity, coercion, mistake, or ill-advised decision, a claimant may be induced or
may otherwise attempt to waive her right to worker's compensation benefits. The legislature has
stated an overriding policy that such a waiver, for any reason, is invalid. Ms. Wernecke made an
ill-advised mistake in entering into the Agreement and the Commission erred in approving it.
The statute is there to protect Ms. Wemecke from her mistake and compels the Commission to
correct its error.
Moreover, an important element of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is that the person
against whom it is invoked must not only assert a right inconsistent with a position previously
taken by her, but must have "knowledge of the facts and [her] rights." Young v. Idaho Dept. of

Law Enforcement, Alcohol Beverage Control Div., 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615,620 (Ct.
App. 1993). ISTF cannot reasonably contend that Ms. Wemecke had knowledge of the facts of a
fiture injury which was yet to occur. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel therefore cannot be raised
as a bar to her present claim.

E. To preclude Ms. Wernecke's claim against ISIF is against the public policy of the
State of Idaho.
The purpose of ISIF is to relieve employers of impaired or disabled persons of "the
responsibility of paying for total disability compensation to [employees] rendered totally and
permanently disabled because of [their] pre-existing handicap coupled with.. .subsequent
industrial injuries." Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 197,200,439 P.2d 931,934

(I 968). This policy encourages employers to hire impaired workers because they are relieved
from paying total and permanent disability benefits if the employee is subsequently injured. Id
By thus providing a source of recovery to an impaired worker who returns to work following an
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injury, workers like Ms. Wemecke are encouraged and enabled to continue working and to
remain productive if they are physically able. This clear societal good is lost if ISIF can avoid its
statutory obligation under $ 72-332 by contracting it away. Equally important, if ISIF is allowed
to avoid liability for Ms. Wemecke's total and permanent disability by paying her the equivalent
of a 7% whole person impairment, the burden of her support is placed on the Social Security
system and the social services safety net of the State of Idaho, a result the legislature, in
establishing ISIF and the worker's compensation system as a whole, clearly intended to avoid.

IV. Conclusion.
The worker's compensation statutes do not permit a claimant to waive her right to
compensation for future injuries. This is true whether the waiver is by agreement with an
employer or surety, or the ISIF. ISIF had no authority to enter into the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement with Ms. Wernecke and the Industrial Commission had no authority to approve it.
Claimant respectfully asks that the Commission to declare the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
invalid and to permit her to proceed with her claim against ISIF for total and permanent
disability arising out of the injury on October 8,2002.
DATED this

&day of June, 2006.
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.

Charles L. Graham
Attorneys for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Z3rd day of June, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner
indicated below:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
PO Box 857
Meridian ID 83680

[ X ] US. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789
[
] Hand Delivery

C-I-LL

Charles L. Graham
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.
P.O. Box 9344
414 S. Jeerson
Moscow, Idaho 83 843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Claimant
Idaho Bar No. 3839
BEFORE 'ITE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,

1

Claimant,
VS.

ST. MARES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT No. 41,

)

LC. NO. 03-515254

)
)

AFFJDAWT OF CHARLES L. GRAHAM

1
)
)

Employer,
and

1

STATE INSURANCE FUND,

)
)
)

1
1

SwetY,
and

)

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY IWiW,

)

1

1

Defendants.

-

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES L. GFLMWM 1

Charles L. Graham, being first duly sworn, states of his personal knowledge as follows:
1. I am an attorney with Landeck, Westherg, Judge & Graham, P.A., attorneys for Patsy
Wemecke in Industrial Commission Case No. 03-515254.
2. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the report of an
evaluation of Ms. Wemecke at the University of Washington Harborview Medical Center dated
April 30,1992.
3. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the report of an

evaluation of Ms. Wemecke by Drs. Alan Alyea and Mark Holmes on October 13, 1992.
4. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement entered into between Ms. Wemecke and the State Insurance Fund in 1994.
5. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement entered into between Ms. Wemecke and the Industrial Special Indemnity
Fund in 1994.

EA
DATED thish=

day of June, 2006.

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this&

rC

day of June, 2006.

~ d t a r Py U ~ Cin g d for the State
of ~daho,residing at Pfi//
ma0 \lJA
My commission expires: X-25-2011

,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27 pA day of June, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner
indicated below:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
PO Box 857
Meridian ID 83680

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail
[ X ] Fax 208-888-2789 w/-$
[
] Hand Delivery
-

c l - ~ L

Charles L. Graham
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University of Washington
Harborview Medical Center
David C. Ashbough.

M.D.

Professor of Surgery
Chief.Thoracic Surgery

April 30,1992

Kathy Proctor
Claims Examiner
Idaho State Insurance Fund
1215 W State Street
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720

RE:

Patsy Wemecke
Qaim
SS #

0/ .2_/

Dear Ms. Proctor:
Iexamined Mrs.Wemecke and have come to the following conclusions:
1.
I do think she has a thoraac outlet syndrome which is contributing to her current pain problems but it is
not responsible for the majority
.
. of her pain. I think most of her pain orij$nates somewhere around the C7,TI
level in her cervical spind

2.

I think that she has an element of chronic pain syndnme.

It is difficult to sort out in this patient how much each of these entities plays in her current pain problem but my
inkling is that thoraac outlet component is probably the least significant and the chronic pain problem is the
most significant. In regards to your other questions, it is difficult for me to make a correlation between her injury
and her current thoraac outlet syndrome. Her initial complaints of pain were all in her neck and back and not
down her arm and it was only later that she began to get radiation down her arm. Even at this time I feel that
a significant portion of her pain is originating from her cwicalspine rather than from the thoracic outlet. It 1s
conceivable that because of her injury she favored her l&bidie'dnd neck in such a manner that she developed a
thoracic outlet syndrome, but I do not believe that th n' ry;.was a direct cause of the thoraac outlet problem
-,
.
In response to your questions about further surgery, it is often difficult to predict whichpatient will get relief
from thoracic outlet operations and those that do not. While there is a chance that she might be significantly
improved, I would guess that she would still h a w pain after removal of the scalenus muscles and fir$t rib. The
only way to find out in cases like this is to actually proceed with the surgery. I would e s t j a e her chances of
success at 50/50 even with w . . @ r g e r y . I do think that a multi-disciplinuy paid clinic referral
.. .,
might be advantageous in long term management of this patients discomfort.
.. ...

-

WY
..

Kathy Procbv
April 30. 1992
Page 2

I think that Mrs. Wernecke is probably stable regarding her injury and I would estimate her disability at 20%.
I base this on the fact that I find no evidence of atrophy or loss of sensation in her &and or arm. She does have
some loss of strength in her grip and ability to lift. 'She should be able to work at employment that does n6t . .
involve heavy lifting and use of her arms over her head for long periods. Lastly, given the fact that she
claims to have had no symptoms prior to her injury, I cannot determiiie that there is any preexisting condition.
I have enclosed a copy of my work-up.

Youn sinceiely,

&2d&fi

David Ashbauzh, MD
professor of ~
Gxy

a@

Regarding:
Findings of a
Medical Bramination
of PATSY WWNECKE

This report is intended to provide you with a fair and
objective review of the medical facts relating to the
claimant's circumstance, including those particular
issues presented for our consideration.

Orthopedist/Orthopedic Surgeon

Regarding:
Findings of a
Medical Examination
of PATSY WERNECKE

This report is intended to provide you with a fair and
objective review of the medical facts relating to the
claimant's circumstance, including those particular
issues presented for our consideration.

~ a r gD. Holmes. M.D.

Kathy Proctor
Idaho State Insurance Fund
1215 West State Street
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720
Medical Examination of Patsy Wentecke
Employer: Valley Vista Care Corp.
Claim k' 9001812
S.S. #
*
Date o
3/92
Date of Birth:
Date of Injury:
Examining Physicians: Drs. Alyea and HolmeS
Dictated bv: Dr. Holmes

CHIEF COMPLAINTS:
Intermittent left arm numbness and back pain.
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:
This patient is a 40-year-old woman who presents with a history
of symptoms dating from an injury that occurred on June 28, 1990.

On that date, the patient was employed as a certified nurse's
assistant for Valley Vista Care Center. Her injury occurred as
follows: During the course of the day, the patient was engaged
in her usual activities of lifting and turning patients. As the
day progressed, she began experiencing pain, affecting the neck
and back diffusely, but primarily affecting the back. At that
time, she did not experience any symptoms
affecting the
extremities.
The patient then consulted J. R. Katovich, M.D., a family
physician. Dr. Katovich diagnosed acute back spasm and suggested
conservative treatment including ice, Flexeril, Talacen and off
work for six days.
The patient noted that her symptoms did not improve. The patient
notes that because she failed to improve, she was kept off work
for an additional several weeks, and she was started on a program
of physical therapy.
The records indicate that an x-ray of the cervical Spine
performed on July 26, 1990, demonstrated failure of segmentation
Of C4-5, but otherwise no evidence of acute fracture. The Study
was interpreted by J. T. Brockley, M.D., of Benewah C O ~ U ~ ~ ~
Hospital in Saint Maries, Idaho.
The patient believes that she went to physical therapy off and on
- 1 -
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for a period of time of almost one year.
Follow-up with Dr. Katovich on August 15, 1990, demonstrated
significant improvement.
'

no

On August 20, 1990, the patient saw J. T. Giesen, M.D., who
indicated that the patient's condition was still characterized by
significant headaches, neck and back pain.
He recommended at
that time a magnetic resonance imaging ( K R I ) scan be performed.
An MRI scan performed on August 31, 1990, of the cervical spine
documented Ill. Blocked vertebra C4-5. 2. Moderate central disc
protrusion C5-6. 3. Moderate left paramedian disc protrusion
C6-7."
The study was interpreted by C. E. Ley, M.D.
Incidently, skull films performed on August'.31, 1990, were
normal.
On September 5 , 1990, Dr. Giesen suggested that in view of the
imaging findings, that a referral to Ernst C. Fokes, Jr., M.D.,
was appropriate.
On September 17, 1990, Dr. Fokes, a neurosurgeon in Coeur
dtAlene, Idaho, examined Ms. Wernecke. His examination disclosed
normal sensorium, no motor findings, symmetric and
normal
reflexes and normal sensation.
His clinical impression was
"Cervical spondylochondrosis without nerve
root
or
cord
impingement.It
Dr. Fokes suggested that the patient's symptoms affectixig the
left hand at that time could well be a "mild carpal tunnel
syndrome.^^ He felt that there was no indication for surgical
treatment at that time.
He did suggest further conservative
treatment including traction, anti-inflammatory medications' and
also suggested that she could return to work.
The patient indicates that she did return to work after that
visit, but was only able to work for two and a half days and
stopped because of increasing symptoms.
The patient was then seen by Graeme French, M.D., of Moscow,
Idaho. On October 11, 1990, Dr. French felt that electromyograms
(EMGs) and nerve conduction studies were indicated and, if these
studies were consistent with the C6-7 radiculopathy, that a
two-level cervical fusion was indicated.
On October 29, 1990, the patient underwent neurodiagnostic
studies by Merle Janes, M.D., of Spokane, Washington. Dr. Janes'
findings included "1. Nerve conduction studies WNL; therefore no
symptoms can be ascribed to peripheral nerve injury; neither can
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any found myopathy. 2. EMG data pattern consistent with C5 and
C6 radiculopathy, right, and C6, left. Pattern shows mixed acute
and chronic findings, the majority chronic."
On November 1, 1990, Dr.
electrodiagnostic studies.

French reviewed

the

patient/$

On December 10, 1990, Dr. Janes evaluated the patient clinically.
Dr. Janes found no motor findings.
He felt that there was .
diminished sensation to pinprick, vibration, and cold in the left
C8 dermatome. Neck range of motion was felt to be three-quarters
normal. His clinical examination was right C5-6 radiculopathy,
reduced neck range of motion secondary to radiculopathy, and
myofascial pain and tenderness secondary to the two above
conditions.
On January 21, 1991, Dr. French reevaluated the patient and
suggested the possibility of a two-level anterior cervical
fusion.
On January 24, 1991, the operative procedure was performed. This
consisted of an "anterior cervical fusion with right iliac crest
graft, C5-6, C6-7.cc The preoperative and postoperative diagnoses
included "herniated disc, C5-6, C6-7."
The patient indicates that she did experience some improvement,
especially in neck pain, after the surgery, but left upper
extremity numbness and paresthesias persist up to the present
time.
On February 2, 1991, Dr. French examined the patient
on
follow-up.
At that time, postoperative hoarseness was still
present, and the patient notes that hoarseness continued for
about three months.
Follow-up notes with Dr. French are noted for March 28, 1991,
April 1, 1991, and April 5, 1991. On the latter visit, Dr.
French in his note indicates that the patient's MRI scan was
"basically normal except for a little foramina1 stenosis."
A formal report of a second MRI, which was performed on March 2 7 ,

1991, and interpreted by R. L. Romey, M.D., disclosed "1.
evidence of cervical fusion
at
C5-6
and
C6-7.
2.
Klippel-Feil deformity at C4-5 with no significant narrowing and
certainly no herniated disc at this level.
3.
C-Spine MRI
otherwise unremarkable."

...

The patient also underwent a course of physical therapy through
the spring of 1991.
Follow-up notes with Dr. French are
indicated as having occurred on May 23, 1991, and June 27, 1991.
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Regarding the latter visit, Dr. French noted that the patient did
not exhibit any definite neurological findings.
The records indicate that on August 2, 1991, Dr. French Suggested
referral to Henry W. Gerber, M.D., in Spokane, Washington, for a
neurosurgical consultation to determine if any cause could be
determined for the patient's shoulder pain.
On August 30, 1991, Robert D. Martz, M.D., a neurosurgeon in
Spokane, examined
the
patient.
His Clinical examination
disclosed complete range of motion of the cervical spine, normal
motor testing for the upper extremities, as well as the lower
extremities. Sensation was diminished to pinprick in the fourth
and
fifth
fingers on the left.
Clinical diagnosis was
"Postoperative left shoulder pain." Dr. Martz suggested x-rays,
including flexion/extension cervical spine films to ensure that
the fusion was solid and that the pain that she was experiencing
was not due to "pseudarthrosis." He also suggested that an
additional EMG study be done to exclude thoracic outlet syndrome.
Cervical spine x-rays performed on August
30, 1991, as
interpreted by Roger P. Blair, M.D., and David P. Thorne, M.D.,
"1.
of Northwest Imaging, Spokane, Washington, disclosed
Anterior fusion at C6-7 with approximately 2.5 mm of posterior
subluxation of C6 on C7 in the neutral and extension views.
There is improved alignment of flexion suggesting a degree of
instability. 2. Evidence of prior fusion at C4-5 which is
stable.
3. Posterior subluxation of C5 on C6 which improves on
extension.
Physical therapy was continued throughout this
through September 1991.

time

including

On September 20, 1991, Dr. Martz indicated in a letter to Dr.
French that physical therapy should be continued. If improvement
did not occur, then consideration should be given to a I'C7 nerve
block."
If that studied proved to be positive, then the patient
might be a candidate for foraminotomy and posterior fusion, or
perhaps repeat of the anterior fusion at C6-7.
The patient underwent the nerve block on October 25, 1 9 9 1 .
The
study was performed by Daniel K. Larson, M.D. The patient noted
that the nerve block did produce some benefit, and the clinical
impression by Dr. Larson was: cqProbableC7 nerve root irritation
as etiology for left shoulder and arm pain."
Dr. Martz, on October 29, 1991, felt that he was not convinced
that a repeat fusion of C6-7 would be of benefit. He did feel
that a thoracic outlet study should be performed.
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An elevated arm stress test was performed on November 25, 1991,
at Vascular Diagnostic Laboratory in Spokane, Washington.
This
study disclosed:
"This study suggestive of significant plexus
compression on the left with arterial compression also noted with
hyper-extension.
This
is suggestive
of Thoracic outlet
syndrome."
The interpreting physician's
name cannot
be
determined from this report.
On December 5, 1991, Dr. Martz reviewed this study and felt that
further treatment was indicated and recommended a referral to a
vascular surgeon, Richard Kleaveland, M.D.
On January 2, 1992, the patient was seen by David Ashbaugh, M.D.,
a thoracic surgeon.
Dr. Ashbaugh did not feel that additional
surgery would be of benefit, and suggested that her condition was
fixed and stable.
If further treatment was indicated, he felt
that a multidisciplinary pain clinic would
be
the
next
appropriate step.
On February 26, 1992, Dr. Martz reiterated his opinion
patient should be referred to see Dr. Kleaveland.

that the

Follow-up notes with Dr. French are noted for March 23, 1992, and
September 4 , 1992.
The patient was seen by Dr. Richard Kleaveland on March 29, 1992.
examination disclosed obliteration of pulses
Dr. Kleaveland's
with abduction and external rotation.
With the elevated arm
stress test, the patient developed discomfort in the upper arm,
and after holding the position for approximately one minute, was
unable to continue, and brought h@r arms in a neutral position.
Grip strength was felt to be satisfactory. Range of motion was
limited because of fusion. No supraclavicular tenderness over
the brachial plexus was present. Examination of the carotids was
normal. Dr. Kleaveland diagnosed thoracic outlet syndrome, left,
and suggested a resection of the first rib and scalenotomy for
treatment of this condition.
The patient did not undergo surgery
syndrome.

for

the

thoracic

outlet

On July 14, 1992, Dr. Ashbaugh suggested a 20-percent disability
based on the pain that the patient developed with heavy use of
the left arm. He also felt that this was, at least in part, a
chronic pain syndrome.
On August 5, 1992, Dr. Katovich suggested that a computerized
tomography (CT) scan of the lower back was indicated for further
evaluation.
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On August 17, 1992, Dr. Ashbaugh, in a letter to Idaho Industrial
Commission, stated that the patient's major problem was chronic
pain originating from the neck injury.
The thoracic outlet
syndrome was probably not related to the injury and, because of
pain, he felt that the patient had a weakness in regard to
repetitive motions of the upper extremity. He Went on to state
that he found it difficult to assign a disability rating based
upon Idaho law.
PRESENT COMPLAINTS:
The patient's condition at present includes pain
located
primarily in the lower back.
There is minimal, if any, pain
affecting the neck. The neck pain only occurs when she moves her
neck. She also experiences intermittent numbness and paresthesias of the left arm, and these symptoms occur when she elevates
the arm or abducts the arm. In neutral position, she is free of
these symptoms.
Overall, the patient's condition has remained unchanged essentially since the immediate postoperative period.
The patient does note some subjective weakness of the
and arm.

left hand

Coughing,
There is no history of bowel or bladder incontinence.
sneezing, or straining have no specific relationship to the
patient's symptoms.
The patient is not receiving any specific treatment for her
condition. The patient is not receiving any specific medications
for this condition.
CHART REVIEW:
The chart was reviewed, and no additional pertinent information
was noted besides that which has been incorporated into this
report.

PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
Past and recent illnesses:

None of significance.

She also underwent a
Surgeries: Right knee surgery in 1978.
cholecystectomy in 1978.
A tracheostomy was performed in 19-71
for treatment of smoke inhalation. A cesarean section Was
performed in 1981.
Allergies: The patient has had adverse effects with the
Keflex, penicillin, and various analgesics.
REVIm OF sy-:

HEENT: Negative.

use

of
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Cardiocirculatory: Negative.
Pulmonary: Negative.
GI:

Negative.

GU:

Negative.

Neuropsychiatric:

Negative.

SOCIAL AND FAMILY HISTORY:
The information in the social and Family History section of this
report was obtained from a form completed by Patsy Wernecke on
the date of this examination, as well as from her interview with
the panel doctors.
The patient is married. She has completed 12 years of education.
There is no history of tobacco consumption at present. The
patient does occasionally consume beer.
The patient has no history of military service.
There is a family history of heart disease. Her father died at
age 61 from heart disease. Her mother died at age 51 also from
heart disease. The patient states that she does not exercise on
a regular basis.
Work history: The patient had been employed as a certified
nurse's assistant (CNA) for Valley Vista Care Center for four
months at the time of her injury. She is not currently working.

PHYSICAL-ATION:
The patient is a wleasant, alert, cooperative
woman.
1ll. - Weight 124 pounds.
Vital Signs:

Height

5'

Blood pressure 118/80. Pulse 68 and regular.

The patient is noted to be right-handed.
HEENT:

Normal.

Lungs: Clear to auscultation.
Heart: Normal first and second heart
gallops are present.
Abdomen:

sounds.

No murmurs

Soft and nontender. No masses are palpable.

Genitalia/Rectal:

Not performed.

Or
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scars: She has a 4-centimeter transverse scar present over the
anterior cervical region. A 6-centimeter right knee scar is
present.
Peripheral pulses:

Full and symmetric.

ORTHOPEDICMEnROLOGIC EXAMINATION:

En bloc truncal rotation does not elicit any symptoms. There is
pain elicited in the neck on minimal axial ioading at the vertex.
There is no visible or palpable muscle spasm. The patient's
posture is good.
There is equal weight bearing. There is no
abnormal kyphosis, lordosis or scoliosis.
There is a pain to very superficial palpation of the cervical
upper
dorsal structures.
There is pain elicited on deep
palpation of the lumbosacral region.
Range of motion findings for the back reveal flexion to 45
degrees, extension to 2 0 degrees, and lateral flexion to 35
degrees bilaterally. Thoracic spine rotation is to 20 degrees
bilaterally.
Range of motion findings for the neck reveal flexion to 2 0
degrees, extension to 3 0 degrees and lateral flexion to 15
degrees right and 10 degrees left. Rotation is to 30 degrees on
the right and to 20 degrees on the left.
Thoracic spine rotation is to 20 degrees bilaterally.
The gait is normal.
There is normal heel and toe walking.
Tandem Romberg is normal. Squatting is performed at two-thirds
normal.
Hip joint range of motion is n'onnalbilaterally.
Shoulder range of motion is normal bilaterally.
Straight leg raising is to 9 0 degrees both sitting and supine
bilaterally. Pain does not increase with dorsiflexion or plantar
flexion bilaterally. Fabere's is negative bilaterally.
43
Leg lengths are symmetric. Thigh circumferences are
centimeters on the right and 44 centimeters on the left. Calf
circumferences are 33 centimeters on'the right and 33 centimeters
on the left. Arm circumferences are 29 centimeters on the right
and 27.5 centimeters on the left. Forearm circumferences are 26
centimeters on the right and 25.5 centimeters on the left.
In terms of mental status, the patient is alert and oriented.
Cognitive functions are intact. Affect is appropriate. Cranial
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nerves I1 through X I 1 are within
funduscopic examination.

normal

limits

including

Motor system examination reveals normal muscle mass, tone
strength throughout.
No abnormal movements are present.

and

Sensory examination reveals diminished pinprick, light touch, and
temperature over the ulnar border of the left hand. Otherwise
all areas are normal in terms of sensation,
There is no limb or truncal ataxia present.
The muscle stretch reflexes are graded 2+ for the biceps,
triceps, brachioradialis, knees and ankles bilaterally. Babinski
signs are not present. There is no clonus, spasticity or visible
atrophy present.
Tinelrs sign is not present at the wrists or elbows bilaterally.
Adsonrs maneuver does not elicit symptoms bilaterally. Phalenls
maneuver elicits paresthesias of the fifth finger, left hand.
There is a bruit noted in the left supraclavicular fossa when the
left arm is abducted and elevated.
DIAGNOSIS:

Status post anterior cervical fusion with right
iliac crest graft, C 5 - 6 , C 6 - 7 , secondary to the
industrial injury of JUne 28, 1990.
2) Probable left thoracic outlet syndrome, unrelated to the industrial injury of June 28, 1990.
3) Chronic pain behavior.
1)

PECOMKENDATXONS AND DISCUfSXON:
It is the opinion of this panel that the patient's objective
findings include only the limitation of cervical range of motion
as determined by physical examination.

The panel does believe that the patient is capable of gainful
employment on a reasonably continuous basis. We would suggest
that restrictions include avoiding lifting over 30 pounds, as
reflected by the industrially related injury. She should avoid
working overhead as a result of the nonindustrial condition
(probable left thoracic outlet syndrome). The restrictions as
imposed by the industrially related condition are permanent in
nature.
The panel believes that the patient's industrially related
condition is medically fixed and stable and no further active
treatment measures will alter the natural history of this
condition.
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The panel suggests that the patient's condition warrants a
recommendation of 16-percent impairment of whole person based
upon the objective findings of limitation of range of motion of
the cervical spine. This estimate is based upon the AMA Guides
to
the Evaluations of Permanent Im~ainnent, third edition
(revised), pages 88 to 90.
END OF REPORT

Hollis A. Mercer
Idaho State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720
(208) 334-2370

Attorney for Defendants Valley Vista Care Corporation and State
Insurance Fund

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,

)

)

Claimant,
vs

IC NO. :

90-702141

SIF NO.:

90-01812

)

1

.

)
)

VALLEY VISTA CARE CORPORATION,
Employer,

1
1

LUMP SUM AGREEMENT

)

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

In consideration of the premises, promises and covenants
hereinafter set forth and subject to the approval of the Agreement

by the Industrial Commission, the parties hereto enter into the
following Lump Sum Agreement and request an order of the Commission
discharging the Defendants from liability pursuant to Section
72-404, Idaho Code.

FIRST:

The parties shall be designated herein as follows:

PATSY WERNECKE is the Claimant herein and during all relevant
times was an employee of VALLEY VISTA CARE CORPORATION hereinafter
referred to as "Employer"; Employer was insured for its worker's
compensation liability by
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
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STATE INSURANCE FUND, hereinafter

~.

C.....

,

C.."!.

referred to as "Surety". The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of
Idaho, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, has the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear, determine and make the appropriate award and
order in this matter.
SECOND:

Claimant alleges that, on or about June 28, 1990

while she was employed by said Employer, she suffered injuries to
her back and neck while in the course and scope of her employment.
At the time of said injury, Claimant was 38 years of age, married
and had one child under the age of 18.

Claimant worked 40 hours a

week earning an average weekly wage of $119.41.

Timely notice was

given to the Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to
the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act.
THIRD:

As will appear from the medical reports, Claimant was

primarily treated by Graeme French, M.D. for C5-6, C6-7 herniated
discs and by Dean Martz, M.D. for thoracic outlet syndrome. On 124-91 Dr. French performed C5-6, C6-7 fusion with iliac crest
graft

.

On 4-29-92 Claimant was evaluated by David Ashbaugh, M.D. at
the request of the Surety.

Dr. Ashbaugh diagnosed thoracic outlet

syndrome and chronic pain syndrome.
multi-disciplinary pain clinic.

Dr. Ashbaugh recommended a

Dr. Ashbaugh estimated Claimant

had a 20% disability.
On 10-13-92 claimant was evaluated by a panel of physicians
through OMAC at the request of the Surety.
Claimant had

sustained a

16% whole

person permanent partial

impairment as a result of her 6-28-90 injury.
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The panel found

FOURTH:

The Employer and Surety have paid Claimant the

following benefits:
MEDICAL

Doctors
J.R. Katovich, M.D.
J.T. Giesen, M.D.
Palouse orthopedic & Fracture Clinic
H. Graeme French, M.D.
M.R. Kleaveland, M.D.
OMAC
St. Joe Valley Clinic
Ernest Fokes, M.D.
Merle Janes, M.D.
Neurosurgery Associates
General Surgery
university of Washington Physicians

Benewah Community Hospital
Kootenai Medical Center
Pullman Memorial Hospital
Gritman Memorial Hospital
Sacred Heart Medical Center
Harborview Medical Center
Physical Therapy
Benewah Community Hospital
Mileaae
Reimburse Claimant
Miscellaneous
Jack's Pharmacy
Radiology ~ssociatesof N. Idaho
North Idaho Imaging Center
Reimburse claimant
Pathology Associates of Spokane
Gress Anesthesia Service
Marketime Drug
Gritman Radiology Consultants
Medical Services Co.
Spokane ~iagnosticRadiology
Vascular Diagnostic Lab
Inland Imaging
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
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United Parcel Service
Ken's Stationary
North Idaho Consulting
Total ~edicalpaid to date:

$ 28,873.22

Claimant agrees to allow Surety to provide to the Commission any
medical records reasonably necessary to effectuate the terms of
this Agreement.

FIFTH:

There are genuine and

substantial disputes and

differences between the parties as to the degree, if any, of
Claimant's

impairment and disability, the need

for retraining

benefits and the need for future medical benefits.

The parties,

however, wish to settle their differences on a full and final basis
advising the Commission that it is in the best interests of the
parties to do so.

Therefore, in an effort to settle this disputed

matter, the Surety tenders to the Claimant and the Claimant accepts
the sum of

$30,000.00

Idaho Code Section

in full and final settlement as provided by

72-404.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT THE CLAIMANT
AGREES TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS NOT LISTED IN THE
FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYER AND SURETY WILL
NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR, NOR DO THEY ASSUME LIABILITY FOR, ANY OTHER
MEDICAL BILLS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SAID LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT SHALL BE
APPORTIONED AS FOLLOWS:
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
Total Temporary Disabilitv Benefits
6 - 2 9 - 9 0 through 9 - 2 3 - 9 0
1 2 weeks, 3 days at $ 1 0 7 . 4 7

a week
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1,035.68

10-7-90 through 12-31-90
12 weeks, 2 days at $107.47
a week

$

1,320.33

1-1-91 through 7-10-91
27 weeks, 2 days at $113.37
a week

$

3,093.37

7-11-91 through 12-31-91
24 weeks, 6 days at $202.96
a week

$

5,045.00

1-1-92 through 6-18-92
24 weeks, 2 days at $212.40
a week

$

5,158.27

TOTAL DUE
Temworary Partial Disability Benefits
Retrainina Benefits
Permanent Partial Imwairment
16% whole person at 80 weeks
at $183.70 a week

$ 14,696.00

TOTAL DUE
(Total paid by Surety: $15,920.55.
Overpayment waived.)
Future Medical Benefits

$

4,996.75

Unau~ortioned Disuuted
Imwairment and Additional
Disabilitv Benefits at 24.5%
whole werson at 122.5 weeks
at $183.70 a week

$

22,503.25

In consideration for this Lump
Sum Aareement uursuant to
Idaho Code Section 72-404.
waiver of riaht of awueal.
waiver of riqht of reconsideration, waiver of riqht of
$
modification

2,500.00

LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
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Less
Less
Less
Less
Less

TTD previously paid
TPD previously paid
Retraining paid
PPI previously paid
LSS advance paid

$ 15,952.65
$
-0$
-0$ 14,696.00
$
-0-

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT

A.
B.
C.

D.

Attorney fees taken prior to LSS
Costs taken prior to LSS
Additional attorney fees to be
- taken from LSS
Additional costs to be taken
from LSS

ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS TO
BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider and amounts.)

E.

Total of Outstanding medicals
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT
(Subtract Lines C & D relating
to attorney fees, and Line E
relating to outstanding medicals,
from the total amount due
claimant of this LSS)
SIXTH:

$

$

0.00
22,145.51

The parties advise the Commission that they believe
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that it is in their best interest that this disputed matter be
settled as herein set forth.
The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of the
temporary disability and permanent partial disability and medical
and related expenses in this matter are uncertain and may be
continuing or progressive and may

substantially exceed those

hereinabove set forth, and the above shall not limit the scope of
this Agreement or the Order of Discharge entered by the Commission
pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights
and claims to all permanent and temporary disability benefits, all
impairment benefits and all medical and related benefits whether or
not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the
parties.
The Claimant

does

agree to

indemnify, defend

and

hold

Defendants harmless from and against any further claim or loss of
any and every kind arising out of or related to the said alleged
accident, and any resultant losses, damages or injuries, including
without limit, any claim respecting past or future hospital,
medical or like expenses.
SEVENTH:

The claimant acknowledges and agrees that she has

carefully read this instrument in its entirety and has been fully
advised regarding the contents of this Agreement by her counsel,
that Claimant understands its contents and has signed same knowing
that the payment Forever concludes, settles and fully disposes of
any and all claims of any kind and nature and character that she
now has or may have individually against Employer and Surety on
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
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concluded and forever discharged and that they may be dismissed
with prejudice by reason hereof, subject only to the Commission's
order and approval.
Pursuant to IAR 72-803.1, a memorandum from Claimant's counsel
accompanies this Agreement setting forth the required information
regarding Claimant's attorney's fees.
EIGHTH:

Upon the omm mission's order approving this Agreement

and subject to the payment of $30,000.00, the balance due Claimant,
the Employer and Surety shall be discharged and released of and
from any and all liability on account of the above-described
accidents and injuries.
DATED this

,

day of

1994.

1

PATSY HERNECKE
Claimant

@torney

WESTBERG \ \
for ~ l a i m a n w

MERLE D. PARSLEY
Manager, State Insurance Fund

JULIE COOPER
Claims Manager, State Insurance
Fund
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HOLLIS A . MERCER
A t t o r n e y f o r Employer, V a l l e y V i s t a
Care C o r p o r a t i o n , a n d S u r e t y , I d a h o
S t a t e I n s u r a n c e Fund.
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Upon the foregoing and good cause appearing and the Industrial
commission being fully advised and having determined that it is for
the best interests of the parties that the liability of the
Employer and Surety and the Fund be discharged in whole by the
payment of the Lump Sum Agreement as provided therein, NOW
THEREFORE:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lump Sum Agreement be and it
hereby is approved as provided by Section 72-404 Idaho Code, and
that the above-entitled proceedings are dismissed with prejudice
and the Employer, Valley Vista Care Corporation, and the Surety,
are discharged and released of and from any and all liability on
account of the above-entitled injuries.
DATED :
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

BY
CHAIRMAN

BY
COMMISSIONER

BY
COMMISSIONER
ATTEST:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
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QUANE, SMITH, HOWARD & HULL
700 Ironwood Drive, Suite 301
P. 0. Box 1758
Coeur dtAlene, Idaho 83816-1758
Telephone: 664-9281

Attorneys for Defendant ISIF

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant,
VS

I.C. 90-702141

.

VALLEY VISTA CARE
CORPORATION,
Employer,

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

I

I

I

IN CONSIDERATION of the premises and promises and
covenants hereinafter set forth, and subject to the above-entitled
Commission~sApproval and Order of Discharge pursuant thereto, the
above-entitled parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
FIRST: As hereinafter referred to, the parties shall be
designated as follows:
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Patsy Wernecke as Claimant, Industrial Special Indemnity
Fund as the Fund, and the Industrial Commission of the State of
Idaho as the Commission.
SECOND:

On June

28,

1990, Claimant was employed as a

nurse's aide by Valley Vista Care Corporation, and on the same
date, Claimant allegedly incurred injuries resulting from an
industrial accident arising out of and in the course of employment
with Valley Vista Care Corporation.

These injuries include

herniated disc at C5-6 and C6-7 which resulted in a two level
anterior fusion on January 24, 1991.
THIRD:

Claimant contends, and the Fund denies, that

Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and
that the Fund is liable for a portion of Claimant's disability due
to preexisting conditions.
FOURTH:

It is the contention of the Fund that there are

disputes concerning:

(1) whether Claimant suffered injuries as a

result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment on June 28, 1990; (2) whether Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled; (3) whether Claimant has a pre-existing
permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Section 72-332
Idaho Code; (4) if Claimant has a pre-existing physical impairment,
whether said pre-existing impairment was manifest and constituted
a hindrance or obstacle to Claimant obtaining employment; (5)
whether in the event Claimant is totally and permanently disabled,
Claimant has pre-existing impairments within the meaning of section
72-332, Idaho Code, which contributed to said disability; (6) the

extent of apportionment of liability for benefits between ~efendant
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employer/surety and the Fund pursuant to Section 72-332, Idaho
Code, in the event liability is assessed against the Fund.
The parties hereto acknowledge that there are serious
questions and, therefore, disputes concerning the above issues. ~t
is further acknowledged that this lump sum settlement is a
compromise settlement of said issues as well as all other issues
whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated
by the parties.
Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the
Commission by duly serving the Fund with appropriate pleadings, the
timeliness and sufficiency as to form of said filings being
conceded by the Fund.
In consideration of this agreement, all parties stipulate
that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be deemed to
adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Workers1
Compensation Laws of Idaho.
FIFTH: Claimant was born o

At the time

of the alleged accident, Claimant was a resident of Fernwood,
Idaho.

Claimant was earning $4.51 per hour as a nurse's aide.

Claimant is currently unemployedand resides in Fernwood, Idaho.
SIXTH: Following the 1990 accident, Claimant was treated
by various physicians, whose reports are on file with the Commission. Claimant was examined by Dr. David Ashbaugh at the request
of the State Insurance Fund on April 28, 1992.

Dr. Ashbaugh

concluded that Claimant suffered a 20% permanent impairment rating
based upon chronic pain as a result of her industrial injury. On
October 13, 1992 Claimant was also examined by a panel of physi-
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cians at the request of the State Insurance Fund.

The panel

concluded that Claimant was capable of gainful employment on a
reasonably continuous basis with restrictions of no lifting over
thirty pounds or working overhead.

The panel concluded that

Claimant was stable and had an impairment rating of 16% of the
whole person.

Copies of these reports are attached.

SEVENTH: It is understood and agreed by and between the
parties hereto that the lump sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be
paid to Claimant by the Fund is in consideration for and in payment
of any and all claims that Claimant may now or hereafter have,
including but not limited to every claim of whatever nature or kind
for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary
disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and all
other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits
against the Fund under the Workers1 Compensation Laws of the State
of Idaho.

This is the case whether or not the full extent of

Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now
known or foreseen, and regardless. of whether the Claimant shall
ever again injure herself in another or future accident, or suffer
any disease which would arguably cause the Fund to be liable for
additional claims or benefits under the laws of the State of Idaho.
Acceptance of this agreement by the Claimant according to the terms
and conditions stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge
the Fund from liability from any claims forever, regardless of
whether such claims arise from the accident which is the subject of
this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments,
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disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter
arising.
EIGHTH:

In making this lump sum agreement and settle-

ment, all parties acknowledge and agree that the Fund does not
admit the allegations of.Claimant, the same being solely for the
purpose of adjudication and settlement of a doubtful and disputed
claim.
NINTH:

It is in the best interests of justice of the

parties hereto that the above-entitled claim be fully, finally and
forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump sum payment
by the Fund to Claimant in the amount of $6,500.00

within a

reasonable time following entry of Order of Discharge and approval
hereof by the Commission.
TOTAL PERHANEEIT
DISABIL3:TY ,BENEBITS:

$6,500.00

Less attorney's fees and
costs payable by claimant
(from proceeds of lump sum
settlement)

$

RECOVERY TO CLAIMANT:

$5,000.00

TENTH:

1,500.00

Claimant is represented herein and has been

counseled by James Westberg of Moscow, Idaho, whose name shall be
included as a payee on the respective settlement drafts to be
delivered to said attorney.by the Fund. Attached as "Addendum

A"

is an accounting from Claimant's attorney, James Westberg, Setting
forth the

information currently required by

the

rndustrial

Commission pursuant to the Commission's administrative rulings
under Section 72-803, Idaho Code.
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ELEVENTH: Upon Commission order approving this agreement
and excepting only payment of said consideration by the Fund, the
Fund shall be fully, finally and forever discharged and released of
and from any and all liability on account of the above Claimant.
TWELFTH:

The terms of this agreement shall be binding

upon all of the above-parties, their heirs, representatives,
successors and assigns.
THIRTEENTH:

The parties waive

findings of

fact,

conclusions of law and the right of appeal or to reopen these
proceedings as part of the consideration of and for this agreement.
The parties hereto specifically and expressly agree, as
part of the consideration herein, that the parties waive the right
to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided under the
worker's compensation laws of Idaho, Section 72-718, Idaho Code.
FOURTEENTH: This agreement is made at Claimant's request
and is the acceptance of offer by the Fund.

By this instrument,

Claimant requests Commission approval hereof and Order of Discharge
pursuant hereto; and the Fund joins in said petition and stipulates
that it shall be granted.

Claimant acknowledges that he has

carefully read this agreement and legal instrument in its entirety,
understands its contents and has executed the same knowing that
this agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of
any and all claims of every kind and character he has or may have
against the Fund, and that these proceedings are concluded and
forever closed by reason hereof, subject only to
approval and order, as aforesaid.
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omm mission

FIFTEENTH:

~ l l
portions of this instrument constitute

binding covenants of the parties, and no portion is a mere recital.

STATE OF IDAHO

1

county of

1

)

ss.

On this
day of February, 1994, before me, the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
appeared PATSY WERNECKE, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she
executed the same.

-

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed my official seal, the day and year first above written.

(SEAL)
APPROVED:

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
EMNITY FUND,
fl
Defendan
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT
The foregoing stipulation agreement and petition having
duly and regularly come before this Commission and appearing that
the interests of justice and of the Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, are
and will be served by approving said agreement and granting the
order of Discharge as prayed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement
shall be, and the same hereby is, APPROVED; and further,

said petition shall be and hereby is GRANTED, and the
above-entitled proceedings against the Fund are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
DATED this

2day of Febryary, 1994.

Assistant Secretary
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Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 S.W. 5" Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680 d ' / f Z
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 '/
Fax: (208) 888-2789
Idaho State Bar No. 2397
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant,
VS.

ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 4 1,

REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RULING

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea
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Law Offices, and submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of its Petition for
Declaratory Ruling.
Claimant has opposed ISIF's Petition for Declaratory Ruling mainly on the basis
of her belief that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue is invalid under Idaho's
worker's compensation law. Initially, ISIF would note the irony of Claimant's counsel's
position in this matter. Though counsel now argues vehemently that the Agreement was
some type of nefarious attempt by the ISIF to avoid its obligations under Idaho law, it
should be remembered that Claimant, through counsel, advanced the Agreement in
question and advocated for its acceptance in front of the Commission in the earlier suit.
Claimant received her consideration for the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and
counsel took fees associated with the settlement. Certainly, Claimant was not forced to
sign the agreement, was represented by counsel and was apprised of her rights and the
full consequences of executing the settlement agreement.
Now Claimant and her attorneys have decided, after having accepted the benefits
of the settlement, that the Agreement was in error and that Claimant was prejudiced and
denied rights to compensation by agreeing to a settlement to which her counsel advanced
during the initial litigation in this matter. ISIF would contend that such a position is
contrary to the general dictates of fairness and substantialjustice that should exist in these
types of proceedings. Moreover, the principles of good faith and finality of results is
clearly violated when a party advocates for the illegality of their own agreements in an
attempt to cure their own past mistakes or claim an advantage in future litigation.
Claimant has not provided any substantial authority for the proposition that the
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue is invalid under Idaho law or that ISIF had no
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authority to enter into it. However, beyond the issues of waiver, estoppel, claim or issue
preclusion in this matter, the Commission should not reward the type of litigation strategy
where a Claimant may accept the benefit of a settlement in connection with a worker's
compensation claim and then later argue for its illegality in an attempt to find a way to be
awarded further benefits to which they are not entitled. Otherwise, the policy of
encouraging settlement of claims would be severely undermined, as parties would lack
confidence in the finality of judgments based on Lump Sum Settlement Agreements and
have legitimate concerns about never-ending litigation.
A.

The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at Issue is not Invalid under Idaho
Code 5 72-318.
Claimant first argues that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement is an invalid

agreement to waive rights to compensation under LC.

5 72-318(2).

That statute provides

that "[nlo agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this Act
shall be valid."

LC. § 72-318(2).

Claimant has not cited any case law in Idaho

interpreting the statute to mean that a lump sum settlement agreement which provides
that payment is being made in consideration for all claims the claimant may also make in
the future against the ISIF is unlawful under the statute.
Claimant attempts to support her position by quoting language from a recent
Idaho Supreme Court case where the Court found that a Claimant's voluntary dismissal
of their worker's compensation claim with prejudice did not constitute a waiver to rights
of compensation under the act. See Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 11 P.3d 92
(2005). Certainly, the Court noted in dicta that the stipulation at issue did not relieve the
employer for all injuries the worker might suffer while employed at Simplot. Id.

REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT OF PETITON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 3

However, the court did not state that an agreement, such as the one disputed in this case,
would be presumptively violative of § 72-318 and the facts of this case differ in material
respects even if Emery did have some application.
First, ISIF would note that the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that
318&IQ

3 72-

prohibits an agreement by an employee to relieve an employer of an obligation

that the emvlover has because of the workers' compensation laws. See Osick v. Public

Employee Ret. Sys., 122 Idaho 457,461,835 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1992); see also Burdick v.
Thornton, 109 Idaho 869,712 P.2d 570 (1985). From all of the case law interpreting LC.
$72-318, it appears clear that the statute is intended to prevent emulovers from advancing
agreements with their employees, outside of the litigation process or not relating to an
actual compensation claim, that may limit an employee's rights under the Worker's
Compensation Act. ISIF is not an empIoyer and the statute does not address agreements
between a claimant and ISIF. More importantly, as Emery and the other cases above
make clear, the statute is not intended to regulate judgments made in connection with a
settlement agreement in a litigation setting.
Indeed, in this case Claimant is not even technically attacking the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement, but the earlier judgment itself. As Idaho Code

3 72-71 1 clearly

provides, an agreement approved by the Commission "shall for all purposes be an award
by the commission." See also Drake v. State, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.3d 397 (1996) (An
approved agreement constitutes a final decision of the Commission). Thus, the issue in
this case is not an employee agreement waiving rights to compensation, but whether
Claimant may reopen the judgment of the Commission. When the Commission approved
the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the Agreement merged into the judgment and the
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Agreement became the decision of the Commission on the matter. If Claimant had any
claim of prejudice or error, her remedy was to timely move to have the Commission
reconsider the judgment, i.e., under Idaho Code $72-718, and/or use of applicable appeal
procedures. However, Claimant may not now seek to re-open the Commission's
decision. More importantly, I.C. $ 72-318 has no application to the facts or procedural
posture of this case.

B.

Claimant's Argument that She was not Compensated for Total and
Permanent Disability has no Import in this Proceeding.

Claimant has also asserted that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement merely
represented a de minimus amount in consideration of a waiver of future claims, a devise
that is in violation of the ISIF's obligation under Idaho Code $ 72-332(1) to compensate a
permanently and totally disabled claimant for the remainder of their income benefits to
which they are entitled out of the Industrial Special Indemnity Account. This argument is
merely a red herring in this proceeding and has no application to the analysis of whether
Claimant may attack the earlier judgment based on the Lump Sum Settlement
Agreement.
The ISIF's responsibility to compensate a claimant under $ 72-332 is contingent
upon the Claimant providing proof that they are permanently and totally disabled. See
Garcia v. J.X. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966,772 P.2d 173 (1989). In the initial proceeding

in this matter, the Claimant attempted to prove total disability and the ISIF opposed that
classification. Instead of both sides presenting their proof to the Commission on the
matter, the parties agreed to settle the claim. Thus, Claimant was compensated for her
claim of total disability. Under Idaho Code $ 72-234, ISIF's manager is granted the
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power to "make agreements, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, for
compensation of injuries.. ."
The fact that Claimant now feels that the amount she received in the settlement
did not adequately compensate her for her claim of total disability is immaterial to the
current analysis. ISIF has the statutory right to enter into agreements with claimants in
regards to their disability claims and the Commission approved the agreement in regards
to Claimant, which became a final judgment when entered. Therefore, ISIF has not
avoided any statutory mandate to compensate claimants who are found to be totally
disabled. Claimant was never found to be totally disabled and accepted settlement of her
disability claim in a manner that is consistent with dictates of the Worker's
Compensation Act.
C.

ISIF May Settle CIaims Where the Claimant's Status as Totally Disabled
is Disputed.
Claimant's next argument that ISIF is not legally entitled to enter into agreements

with claimants settling claims of permanent disability where ISIF denies liability for total
disability payments is somewhat confusing and not in line with controlling law. Once
again, Idaho Code

5

72-324 provides authority for ISIF to enter into agreements with

Commission approval to resolve claims of an injured worker claiming total disability.
Though Claimant appears to argue that a compensation agreement under Idaho Code §
72-1 11 may only be entered into between employers and an afflicted employee, such is
contrary to established precedent. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.2d 397
(1996) (any liable party and an injured employee are permitted to enter into a settlement
with regard to compensation, but the agreement must be approved by the Commission).
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Claimant's argument would essentially entail the ISIF being prevented from ever
entering into any agreement with a claimant in order to discharge its liability. Clearly,
such a result is not mandated by the Act or any provision of Idaho law. Once again,
Claimant also makes the unsupported and bare assertion here that the terms of the
Agreement at issue did not conform to the provisions of law and, therefore, that the ISIF
was not lawfully entitled to enter into the Agreement at issue. Of course, Claimant
completely ignores the fact that the Commission has already approved the Agreement
and, therefore, there should be a presumption that the Agreement was in accordance with
the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act.

This also demonstrates that

Claimant's complaint is really with the Commission's earlier judgment, not with the
Agreement itself. It should further be noted that Claimant did not take issue with any of
the case law ISIF cited in its earlier briefing in this matter evidencing that courts around
the country have consistently allowed a claimant to properly release and waive future
workman's compensation claims against a defendant in the course of a settlement
agreement.
However, Claimant also misses the entire purpose for including a provision
preventing a claimant from asserting future claims of total disability in a compensation
agreement. Unlike a standard worker injury claim, a claim for total permanent disability
by its very nature is a conclusive claim. One cannot continue to become permanently
disabled, the way they can continue to be injured in a work-related injury. By making a
total disability claim, a claimant is not merely seeking benefits because of one
occurrence, by which the claimant may return to work in some manner. The claimant is
arguing that they are totally disabled, a claim that cannot, by its very nature, be raised
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multiple times.
Certainly, Claimant may have a reasonable argument here if an employer
attempted to forge an agreement relieving itself of hture liability as to a work-related
accident that had not yet occurred. However, a person who is asserting that they are
totally disabled is asserting that they are forever totally disabled. They cannot reasonably
accept benefits on a total disability claim and then continue to assert future claims of total
disability. Otherwise, they should have never accepted benefits for total disability in the
first place, as they were able to return to work and allegedly suffer another "totally
disabling injury."
In this case, Claimant accepted payment from ISIF under the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement in regards to a claim of total disability. It makes perfect sense that
ISIF, as part of that Agreement, would want to prevent Claimant from asserting future
claims for total disability when payment had already been made under such a claim. It
makes little sense that one worker should be able to gain benefits on a number of
occasions for claiming total disability. ISIF would have little incentive to settle disputed
total disability claims if the Claimant could continue to assert total disability claims in the
future.
Claimant's contention that ISIF may only enter into agreements with a claimant
whom the ISIF acknowledges is totally and permanently disabled and which agreement
merely provided the method and structure for payment of benefits is completely
unsupportable by Idaho statutory or case law. The ISIF may clearly enter into settlement
agreements to discharge its obligations under 972-332. Moreover, those agreements
would have little weight or purpose if an injured worker could accept payments for a
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claim of total disability and then assert future claims of total disability. Therefore, the
ISIF was fully within its rights to insert a provision in the Agreement limiting the
Claimant's ability to assert such future claims. The Commission conclusively determined
that such settlement was in accord with applicable law and within the best interests of the
parties and approved the ~ ~ r e e m e n t . '

D.

Claimant has not Provided Adequate Authority to Prevent the
Application of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in this Case.
Claimant's only argument to the application of collateral estoppel in this case is

that the ISIF's liability with regard to claimant's future injuries was not, and was never
capable of, being decided in the prior action. However, Claimant once again confuses
claims of future injury with claims of total disability.

As noted earlier by ISIF,

Commission approval of a lump sum agreement constitutes a final judgment on the
merits of a claim. Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931
P.2d 1207 (1997). In this case, the Commission approved an Agreement, which merged
into a final judgment, that Claimant was to receive the sum of $6,500 "in consideration
for and in payment of any and all claims the claimant may now or hereafter have.. ."
Therefore, the issue of whether Claimant could assert future claims of total disability
against ISIF was actually and conclusively decided in the earlier suit.
It is immaterial to the collateral estoppel analysis in this case that Claimant could

' Claimant also references in her brief that the Commission had no authority to approve the Agreement at
issue. Once again, the ISIF would argue that this attack is on the Commission's jurisdiction and authority to
enter a final order in the initial suit between these parties which dismissed Claimant's claim and, therefore,
is an attack on that earlierjudgment itself. As such, this particular issue has no weight in this proceeding, as
any attack that the earlierjudgment was made in error is clearly time-barred.
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have incurred a future injury which would involve a completely new set of facts. The
issue to be estopped is not the future injury itself or the new set of facts or circumstances
surrounding such injury. The issue is limited to Claimant's ability to raise new claims of
total disability aeainst ISIF. There is little doubt that this issue was clearly decided in the
earlier suit and, as argued above, Claimant's knowing and educated waiver of her right to
bring future total disability claims against ISIF is not barred by Idaho Code 5 72-3 18(2).
Thus, collateral estoppel applies to bar Claimant's current claim.
Likewise, there is no merit to Claimant's contention that res judicata does not
apply in this case since the Commission did not actually adjudicate her future injuries,
since they had not yet occurred. Claimant continues to get hung up on whether the
Commission in fact adjudicated her future injuries, when the issue is whether Claimant's
right to receive compensation from ISIF for any future claim of total disability was
actually adjudicated. Since the Agreement necessarily became part of the order and final
judgment in the earlier case, the Commission conclusively adjudicated the issue, barring
Claimant from asserting future claims of disability against the ISIF, regardless of whether
she suffered a future injury in any work-related capacity. Res judicata also applies to bar
the current claim against the ISIF.

E.

Judgment in Favor of the ISIF Would not Violate Public Policy
ISIF would suggest that it is neither proper nor an act of good faith for Claimant

to accept the benefits of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, understanding the
meaning and import of the waiver at issue and then turn around and attempt to avoid the
application of its provisions by now claiming that it violates the public policy of the State
of Idaho. Certainly, Claimant did not feel the Agreement was violative of public policy
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when she accepted the check from the ISIF. Claimant's counsel did not argue for the
Commission to reject the Agreement because it was unlawful and against public policy
when it accepted fees associated with the claim. Claimant's impassioned plea invoking
public policy has only come out of the bag now that Claimant and counsel feel they erred
in accepting the earlier Agreement and now seek to avoid the terms they agreed to in
order to be provided further benefits and fees.
ISIF would contend that part of the public policy of the Worker's Compensation
laws is also the encouragement of the settlement of claims and the finality of judgments.
Allowing Claimant to move forward with this claim against ISIF in the face of a clear and
unambiguous agreement which by its terms prevents Claimant from asserting this action
against ISIF both discourages the use of settlement in these types of proceedings and
undercuts the finality of worker's compensation judgments.

Therefore, the ISIF

respectfully requests that the Commission uphold their earlier judgment and Agreement,
barring Claimant from asserting liability against ISIF on a claim of total disability in this
case.

DATED this

day of July, 2006.
MALLEA LAW OFFICES

s-*
I

/

Kenneth L. Mallea
Attorney for DefendantIISIF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6'h day of July, 2006, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Charles L. Graham
c/o Landeck Westberg
PO Box 9344
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Mark T. Monson
PO Box 8456
Moscow, Idaho 83843

X X by U.S. mail
b

y hand delivery

b

y overnight mail

-by facsimile

Kenneth L. Mallea
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant,

ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT #04 1, Employer,

1
1

and

NOTICE OF HEARING

STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

FILED

1
1
1

AUG 1 0 2006
INDUSTRLAL COMMISSION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will he held in the above-entitled matter on

OCTOBER 11,2006 at 9:00 a.m., Pacific Time, for one-half day, in the Industrial Commission
field office, 1111 Ironwood Drive, Suite A, City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of
Idaho, on the following issues:

1.

Whether the construction, validity or applicability of a prior Lump Sum Agreement

entered into between Petitioner and Claimant on the right of Claimant to maintain the current action
against Petitioner is barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and,
2.

Whether Claimant's Complaint against ISIF should be dismissed.

-

NOTICE OF HEARING 1

*

DATED this k2_ day of

Ad

,2006.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a

&&

I hereby certify that on the J!$- day of
,2006 a true and correct copy of
the NOTICE OF HEARING was served by Un@d States Certified Mail upon each of the
following:
CHARLES L GRAHAM
PO BOX 9344
MOSCOW ID 83843-9344
KENNETH L MALLEA
PO BOX 857
MERIDIAN ID 83680
and by regular United States mail upon:
M&M COURT REPORTING SERVICES
8 16 SHERMAN AVE #7
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814

and courtesy copy to:
THOMAS V MUNSON
PO BOX 8266
BOISE ID 83707-8266
and by Email to:
INDUSTRIAL, COMMISSION FO -- CDA
cjh

-

NOTICE OF HEARING 2

-

78 SW 5TH

AVENUE, SUITE
1
POST OFFICE BOX 857

KENNETH L. MALLEA

TELEPHONE

MERIDIANID 83680-0857

ATTORNEYAT LAW

(208) 888-2790
FAX

(208) 888-2789
E-MAIL

KLM@MALLEALAW.COM

August 14,2006
James F. Kile, Commissioner
Industrial Commission
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Re:

Wevnecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41, SIF, ISIF
I.C. Case No. 15-000083 (03-5 15254)

Dear Commissioner Kile:

2

0
C

q
z I

I have received the Notice of Hearing entered in this matter.

d

I-

8 - m

I note that the hearing has been scheduled on the following issue:

5 g

"1. Whether the constructibn, validity or applicability o f a prior
Lump Sum Agreement entered into between Petitioner and
~laimahtonthkright of Cliimiit to maintain the cuirent action'
against Petitioner is barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel."

EL?
-3
, .

9

Commissioner Kile, the ISIF has raised additional legal arguments in support of its
Petition for Declaratory Ruling in this case beside that of collateral estoppel. Consequently, I do
not think it is correct or appropriate to limit the first issue solely to application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
Perhaps the Commission did not in any way mean to limit my Petition or argument solely
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, I have had the Commission rule that only the
designated issue will be heard, and I do certainly believe that other legal doctrines are presented
to the Commission in my Petition for Declaratory Ruling other than the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
I therefore am respectfully requesting entry of an Amended Notice of Hearing or some
other communication fromthe Commis'sion to coutrselandthe parties confirming that our
Petition is not confined to applicitisn oft& dbctrine of collateral estoppel. ". '.'.
,

WJ

0

'lames F. Kile, Commissioner
August 14,2006
Page 2
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,

KLM/dm
cc: Charles I.. Graham
-ThQW&unson
Verlene Wise

hzdn=rsn-)

78 SW STH AVENUE, SUITE 1
POSTOPFICEBOX 857
MERIDIAN ID 83680-0857

KENNETH L. MALLEA
ATTORNEY AT LAW

TELEPHONE

(208) 888-2790
FAX

(208) 888-2789
E-MAIL
KLM@MALLEALAW.COM

August 15,2006
Mark T. Monson
PO Box 8456
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Re:

Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41, SIF, ISIF
LC. Case No. 15-000083 (03-5 15254)

Dear Mark:
Enclosed please find the Notice of Hearing entered in this matter as well as a copy of our
response letter to the Commission. As you will note the Certificate of Service indicates that a
courtesy copy was sent to Thomas V. Munson. Regrettably, instead of sending you a copy of
our letter, we also sent the copy to Thomas Munson.
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,

:Z

C7

c
rn

Kenneth L. Mallea
KLMIdm
Encs.
cc:
Commissioner James F. Kile
Charles L. Graham
Thomas V. Munson
Verlene Wise

s - 4
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
POBOX83720
Boise, ID837200041

(208)3346MM - FAX (208) 334-2321

COMMISSIONERS
Thonim E L!mba& Chauman
J-F
kle
R D ~a ynsrd
Mindy Montgomery. D i m ,

JAMES E. RISCH,GOVERNOR

August 15,2006
Kenneth L. Mallea
PO Box 857
78 SW 5ULAve., Ste. 1
Meridian, ID 83680

RE:

Wamecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41
and State Insurance Fund and Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity
IC 15-000083 (03-515254)

Dear Mr. Mallea:

I have reviewed your recent letter of August 14 concerning the scope of the issues now
scheduled for hearing on October 11,2006 in Coeur d'Alene. It would be most helpful if you
could identify the additional issues presented in your petition, which you desire to present and
argue at the hearing. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

/Ycc:

James F. Kile

Charles L. Graham
PO Box 9344
Moscow. ID 83843-9344
M q k Monson (w/enclosure)
PO Box 8456
Moscow. ID 83843-8456

317 Main Street. Boise, ID
Equal Opportunity Employer

~J&LLE;A
78 SW 5TH

OFFICES
AVENUE, SUITE

1

POSTOFFICEBOX857
MEI~IDIAN
ID 83680-0857

KENNETH L. MALLEA
ATTORNEY AT LAW

TELEPHONE

(208) 888-2790

FAX

August 16,2006
James F. Kile, Commissioner
Industrial Commission
P. 0 . Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041
Re:

Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41, SIF, ZSIF
I.C. Case No. 15-000083 (03-5 15254)

Dear Commissioner Kile:
Thank you for your letter of August 15,2006. My suggestion would be simply that the
Notice of Hearing indicate that the Industrial Commission will hear oral argument on the
pending Petition for Declaratory Ruling. This would allow me to argue all of the various factual
and legal points which have been raised in the briefing and would likewise allow Mr. Graham an
opportunity to rebut those arguments.
If it is necessary to set forth the particular factual and legal arguments which we have
raised, then I would simply rest upon the Petition, Supporting Affidavit, Memorandum in
Support and my Reply Memorandum.
It is my understanding that the purpose of the hearing on October 11,2006 is simply to
permit counsel an opportunity to argue their respective positions and to allow the Commissioners
an opportunity to ask questions regarding the pending Petition. It seems to me that the hearing is
analogous to a District Court hearing on a pending Motion for Summary Judgment. If I am in
someway misunderstanding your request, I apologize. If I can be of any further assistance to you
or the Con~missioners,please let me know.

KLMidm
cc: Charles L. Graham
Mark T. Monson
Verlene Wise

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COhXiWSSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

FILED

PATSY WERNECKE,

SEP - 7 2006

Claimant,

MNJSTRlALCOMMISSION

v.
ST. MARES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT #041, Employer,
and

1
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,

)
)
)

and

AMENDED
NOTICE OF HEARING

1
1
1
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on

OCTOBER 11,2006 at 9:00 a.m., Pacific Time, for one-half day, in the Industrial Commission
field'office, 1111 Ironwood Drive, Suite A, City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of
Idaho, on all relevant issues presented in the pleadings of the parties.
DATED this

w
1

day of September, 2006.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

0
James F. Kile,

-

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 1
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MARK MONSON
PO BOX 8456
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456
cjh
cc:
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATSY WERNECKE,

FILED

Claimant,

JAN I 9 2007
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ST. MARLES JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT #041,
Employer,
ORDER ON PETITION
FOR
DECLARATORY RULING

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

On May 18,2006, Defendant, State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISD?),
filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling pursuant to Rule 15, Judicial Rules of Practice and
Procedure (JRP), along with a Memorandum in support of the Petition. Thereafter, Claimant
timely filed a Memorandum in Response to the Petition, together with an affidavit of Claimant's
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attorney. ISIF filed a reply on July 7,2006. To fully explore the parties' positions, the
Commission held a hearing in Coeur d'Alene on October 11,2006. Present at the hearing were
Commissioners Limbaugh, Kile and Maynard, Charles Graham representing Claimant, Kenneth
Mallea on behalf of ISIF and Mark Monson on behalf of Defendant Employer and the State
Insurance Fund. Also attending the hearing were Claimant and her husband, a representative of
ISIF, and an associate from Mr. Graham's office.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND

In 1991 Claimant filed a complaint against Valley Vista Care Corp., (Valley) her
employer at that time. Claimant's complaint was also against SIF and ISIF. Issues arose
regarding total and permanent disability, pre-existing impairment and causation. Claimant
eventually settled her claims with Valley and SIF. In 1994, Claimant entered into a Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement (LSSA) with ISIF, releasing ISIF &om all future Workers' compensation
claims for her alleged total and permanent physical restrictions for the sum of $6,500. The
Commission approved the LSSA between Claimant and ISIF on February 18, 1994.
The current controversy stems from a new claim, filed by Claimant against ISIF on April
26,2006. Claimant sustained a shoulder injury while cleaning tables as a custodian with St.
Maries. Claimant alleges a number of pre-existing ailments, combined with this new shoulder
injury, have rendered her totally and permanently disabled. ISIF denies liability.
JURISDICTION

A controversy exists in this case as Defendant ISIF has requested the Commission to
interpret the 1994 LSSA. Because LSSAs are considered final orders of the Commission, a
LSSA may be interpreted under Rule 15, JRP, and, therefore, a declaratory ruling on the 1994

-
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LSSA is warranted. See: Davidson v. H.H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758,718 P.2d 1196 (1986).
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
There are essentially five issues that have been argued by the parties: (1) collateral
estoppel; (2) res judicata; (3) waiver; (4) quasi-estoppel; and (5) ISIF's authority to enter into a $
72-404 LSSA, which absolves I S F from future liability as regards total and permanent liability
claims. Each party has made extensive arguments on these issues, both in briefing and at the
hearing. Both parties are commended for their scholarship concerning this Petition.
ISIF contends that Claimant completely and voluntarily released ISIF from all future
claims in 1994 by signing the LSSA. As a result, she should be collaterally estopped from
pursuing another, similar complaint against the ISIF. ISIF goes on to allege that Claimant is
attempting to re-litigate the same claim as was litigated in 1994, thus triggering the doctrine of
res judicata. ISIF further argues that Claimant is estopped from asserting her most recent claim,
due to the theory that Claimant waived her right to assert liability against ISlF when she signed
the 1994 LSSA. This argument is similar to the collateral estoppel argument but is labeled as
"waiver."
Claimant contends the 1994 LSSA is void under Idaho Code $72-3 18(2) because it is an
agreement between an employee (Claimant) and an employer to waive her rights to compensation
under the Workers' Compensation Act. Claimant goes on to argue that the 1994 LSSA did not
adequately compensate Claimant for total and permanent disability. Claimant further alleges that
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Claimant's new claim against ISIF
as the same issues are not being litigated. Further, $ 72-318(2) bars the waiver of Workers'
Compensation rights anyway. Finally, Claimant argues that a ruling in ISF's favor would

-
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violate public policy. Claimant cites Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 197,439 P.2d
931, (1968), for a reminder that the purpose of ISlF is to relieve employers of impaired or
disabled persons of "the responsibility of paying for total disability compensation to [employees]
rendered totally and permanently disabled because of [their] pre-existing handicap coupled
with.. .subsequent injuries." See: Id., 92 Idaho at 200,439 P.2d at 934.
ISlF responds that the statutory language of Idaho Code 5 72-318 does not apply. It only
prohibits agreements between employees and employers. No such agreement is part of this
situation. Further, ISIF is not an employer. ISIF states that Claimant was compensated for her
claim of total disability when she was paid $6,500 as part of the LSSA. ISIF cites Idaho Code 5
72-324 for ISIF's authority to settle claims where a claimant's status as a total-perm is disputed.
Finally, ISlF argues that a ruling in its favor would not violate public policy. Claimant certainly
did not think the LSSA was a violation of public policy in 1994.

ANALYSIS
The Commission appreciates the parties' thorough briefing and exemplary participation at
the hearing in this matter. The parties have presented the Commission with thoughtful analysis
and have argued their points extremely well.

Idaho Code 8 72-318(2)
The language of this provision is straightforward, and provides that: "No agreement by an
employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid." Claimant argues that
this language prohibits Claimant's agreement with ISIF that was reached in the 1994 LSSA.
Claimant's position that Idaho Code 72-318(2) voids the 1994 LSSA is misplaced. This
provision was established to prohibit an agreement between an employee and employer that
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would limit the employee's rights to workers' compensation benefits. It does not limit a party's
ability to negotiate and finalize an agreement to resolve benefit claims in a contested adjudication
of those issues.
The application of 5 72-3 18(2) can be described by the following simplistic examples.

An employee takes a job at a convenience store. During the employee's second day of work, the
employee and the employer enter into an agreement whereby the employer will have no liability
for any workers' compensation benefits that might be due to the employee should he become
injured at work, in exchange for a dollar an hour more in wages. Another example may be the
situation, post-injury, when the injured worker agrees to waive his rights to any workers'
compensation benefits if the employer retains his employment status. Both situations involve
consideration for the agreement, but each fictional situation is clearly against the language and
spirit of 5 72-31 8(2). In the case of a lump sum settlement agreement, however, the parties are
voluntarily entering into an agreement over disputed claims that will release one party's liability
in exchange for payment of funds. See: Idaho Code 5 72-404.
Should Claimant's reasoning hold true, essentially no agreement under $5 72-404 and 72324 could be valid. Not only would this destroy ISIF's willingness to enter into such agreements,
but it would most certainly harm the interests of claimants, as they would lose the avenue of
settlement as a possible option to resolve workers' compensation claims. The Commission is not
willing to impose such a drastic handicap on either ISIF or claimants.
The present situation has added complexity because an agreement with ISIF is requested
only when a claimant alleges total and permanent disability. Total and permanent disability is

-
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the highest assessment of disability that can be given to a worker, meaning that a worker cannot
return competitively to the workforce. Thus, ISIF can be liable to an individual worker only one

time,when the worker is totally and permanently disabled.

The question then remains, who has

the burden of determining whether a claimant is truly totally and permanently disabled and if
they will be returning to work? When cases are litigated, the Commission makes a written,
factual determination of total and permanent disability.

In a workers' compensation case, which proceeds through the litigation process, there are
evidentiary burdens placed upon the parties. Yet, inherent in the settlement process is the
abandonment of the burden of proof. The parties need not go forward with testimony and
documentary evidence to prove specific facts. The fundamental requirement for the approval of a
lump sum settlement agreement is that the Commission determines that the settlement agreement
"is for the best interest of all parties." See: Idaho Code 9 72-404.
The 1994 LSSA set forth the parties' competing contentions regarding Claimant's total
and permanent disability and ISIF liability. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332, ISIF is liable for
the remainder of income benefits to an injured employee who has a pre-existing permanent
physical impairment, which has combined with a subsequent industrial injury, causing the
employee to be totally and permanently disabled. In the 1994 LSSA, Claimant claimed that she
was totally and permanently disabled and unable to work, and that ISIF was liable for a portion of
her disability due to preexisting conditions. See: 1994 LSSA p.2.
As stated above the Commission does not make additional findings and determinations
when approving a lump sum settlement. The Commission is directed to review the settlement to
make sure it is in the best interests of all parties. Given the statements made by the parties in the

-
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1994 LSSA, the Commission was within its authority to evaluate the document and approve the
1994 LSSA granting Claimant a payment from ISIF.
The administrative approval process does not produce any additional written
determinations of a claimant's entitlement to benefits and the extent of disability, as are made
after a contested hearing. Rather, a settlement avoids the necessity of any further administrative
determination of those factual issues for the benefit of the parties. The 1994 LSSA was, more
than anything else, an acknowledgement of Claimant's receipt of compensation for her alleged
condition of total and permanent disability.
The settlement process allows parties an expeditious resolution without the difficulties
inherent to litigation. Lump sum settlement agreements are a respected way to reach an
agreement that is acceptable to all parties. It is a rare case when the hearing and decision process
makes even one party content with the outcome, let alone

parties. A responsible employer

and an injured worker are permitted to enter into a settlement with regard to compensation, but
the agreement must be approved by the Commission. See: Idaho Code 5 72-404, -71 1. Upon
approval, the agreement is for all purposes considered to be an award by the Commission. Id.
The approved agreement constitutes a final decision of the Commission, which is subject to a
motion for reconsideration or rehearing pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-718. See: Drake v.

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 128 Idaho 880,882,920 P.2d 397,399 (1996). The 1994
LSSA clearly set forth Claimants contention that she was totally and permanently disabled and
unable to work. See: 1994 LSSA p. 2.
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The 1994 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement

The fundamental question to resolve is the impact of the 1994 settlement between
Claimant and ISIF. Within the text of the 1994 LSSA, it becomes clear that the parties were not
in agreement as to whether Claimant was totally and permanently disabled, whether the accident
arose out of the course and scope of employment, whether Claimant had pre-existing physical
impairments that had manifested, and apportionment. These disagreements do nothing to lessen
the validity of the 1994 LSSA. Recognizing these disputes, the parties agreed to the following
statement:
The parties hereto acknowledge that there are serious questions and, therefore,
disputes concerning the above issues. It is further acknowledged that this lump
sum settlement is a compromise settlement of said issues as well as all other
issues whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the
parties.
It is clear the parties freely intended to settle the issue of permanent disability through
compromise. Even more important is the following language from the 1994 LSSA:
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the lump sum
vavment of $6.500.00 aneed to be vaid to Claimant hv the Fund is in
consideration for and in pavment of anv and all claims that Claimant may now or
hereafter have, including
- but not limited to every claim of whatever nature or kind
for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary disability
compensation, permanent disability compensation and all other claims that
claimant couldnow or hereafter make fir benefits against the Fund under the
Workers' Comvensation Laws of the State of Idaho. (emphasis added)
A

.

-

This language clearly indicates Claimant's position in 1994. Claimant accepted $6,500 as
consideration to support the 1994 LSSA between Claimant and ISF, even though Claimant
could have litigated the case and potentially collected greater benefits for the rest of her life. The
Commission did not force Claimant or ISIF to accept the 1994 LSSA.
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Now, having been paid by ISIF for her claim that she was totally and permanently
disabled, Claimant cannot claim again she is totally disabled. A worker may not collect for a
second time workers' compensation benefits from ISIF for industrial injuries sustained after
being classified as permanently and totally disabled, because the classification presumes that the
worker is unable to work. A subsequent lesser disability cannot be superimposed upon the
maximum disability recognized by the law.
Summary of Theories

It is clear that Claimant entered into the 1994 LSSA and received $6,500 as compensation
for her disputed injury. It is irrelevant that ISIF did not concede Claimant's status as totally and
permanently disabled. Claimant alleged total and permanent disability, voluntarily entered into
the LSSA and received $6,500 as consideration for the release of her claim of total and
permanent disability against ISIF. It is purely speculative for Claimant to engage in any
discussion about the "real" worth of Claimant's settlement in 1994 compared to her present
injury. She compromised all arguments in accepting the terms of the full and final settlement
with ISIF. Once the Commission approved the terms of the settlement agreement, the settlement
became a final award and judgment of the Commission. See: Davidson v. H.H Keim Co., 110
Idaho 758,718 P.2d 1196 (1986). Moreover, Claimant still retained her rights to rehearing,
reconsideration andlor appeal if she had "buyer's remorse" or truly had legitimate legal concerns
over the validity of her settlement. Those rights lapsed when Claimant did not avail herself of
those legal remedies. The Commission is not convinced by Claimant's arguments that the 1994
LSSA is void under any circumstance. Nor is the Commission willing to open the door to
potentially thousands of settlements fully and freely entered into by claimants, employers,
ORDER / DISSENTING OPINION - 9

sureties, and the ISIF during the past 12 years. Lastly, a final award through the settlement
process is not subject to modification. See: Idaho Code 72-719(4).
ISIF has presented a number of theories regarding why Claimant's most recent claim
should be barred: res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver, and quasi-estoppel.
Res Judicata
Res judicata is generally invoked to bar a subsequent suit between the same parties or
their privies upon the same cause of action. See: Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho
724,552 P.2d 776 (1976). Idaho Code ij 72-718 codifies a variation of the doctrine of res
judicata; decisions by the Commission are conclusive only as to matters actually adjudicated,
rather than as to all matters which could have been adjudicated. See: Woodvine v. Triangle

Dairy, Znc., 106 Idaho 716,682 P.2d 1263 (1984). It follows that a compensation agreement
approved by the Commission is res judicata only with respect to matters actually determined by
that agreement. See: Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284,756 P.2d 401 (1988).
ISIF contends that Claimant is attempting to re-litigate the same claim as was litigated in
1994, thus triggering the doctrine of res judicata. Claimant alleges that the doctrine of res
judicata does not bar Claimant's new claim against ISIF, as the same issues are not being
litigated.
As discussed above, Claimant and ISIF entered into the 1994 LSSA to settle the issue of
Claimant's total and permanent disability. The issue of Claimant's total and permanent disability
and entitlement to benefits from ISIF was resolved by the 1994 LSSA, and is precluded by res
judicata.
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Collateral Estouvel
Collateral estoppel will apply if each of the following questions is answered in the
affirmative.
1) Did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?
2) Was the issue decided in the prior litigation identical with the one presented in
the action in question?
3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation?
4) Was there a final judgment on the merits?
5) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?
See: Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689,691,931 P.2d 1207, 1209
(1997).

ISIF contends that Claimant completely and voluntarily released ISIF from all future
claims in 1994 by signing the LSSA. As a result, she should be collaterally estopped from
pursuing another, similar complaint against the ISIF. Claimant alleges that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel does not bar her new claim against ISIF, as the same issues are not being
litigated.
The issue settled by the 1994 LSSA is that of ISIF's liability to Claimant. ISIF is not
liable for specific industrial accidents and the consequential injuries. ISIF is only liable when a
claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Here, ISIF entered into the 1994 LSSA to resolve
the issue of total and permanent disability. In the 1994 LSSA Claimant contended that she was
totally and permanently disabled, and as such she was entitled to payments from ISIF. The
parties entered into the settlement agreement to resolve the issue of Claimant's total and
permanent disability. Claimant is precluded by collateral estoppel fmm asserting another claim
against ISIF, which she specifically released from any future liability.
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Waiver
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right. See:Brand S.Corp.
v. King, 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981). ISIF argues that Claimant is estopped from

asserting her most recent claim, due to the theory that Claimant waived her right to assert liability
against ISIF when she signed the 1994 LSSA. Claimant avers that $72-318(2) bars the waiver of
Workers' Compensation rights, including Claimant's right to pursue ISIF a second time.

In the present case Claimant is not waiving her rights to compensation. She can be totally
and permanently disabled once, and under the appropriate circumstances she can receive
compensation from ISIF for her total and permanent disability only once. Claimant received
compensation from ISIF for her claim of total and permanent disability in 1994. The express
agreement of the parties waived any further claims against ISIF for total and permanent
disability.
Quasi-Estopvel
Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. See:KTVB Inc., v. Boise City, 94
Idaho 279,281,486 P.2d 992,994 (1971). This equitable theory of contract also applies here, as
Claimant is currently taking a position inconsistent with her position during the signing of the
1994 LSSA. In 1994, Claimant declared she was totally and permanently disabled and received
settlement benefits as a result thereof. Claimant was represented by an attorney and explicitly
endorsed the 1994 LSSA through her signature. Claimant's current position, that the 1994 LSSA
is void, is contrary to her explicit declaration, and is clearly prejudicial to ISIF.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Petition for Declaratory Ruling should be, and is hereby,
GRANTED. As a result, Claimant's current claim against ISIF is barred due to the 1994 Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement, which fully, finally and forever discharged and released ISLF from
all future liability on account of Claimant's total and permanent disability.

DATED this

/?7d.J
day of&

,2007,

INDUSTFSAL. COMMISSION

ATTEST:

Commissioner R.D. Maynard dissenting:
After thoroughly reviewing the applicable statutes and existing case law regarding this
matter, I respectfully dissent from the conclusions of the majority. The lump sum settlement
agreement was void, ab initio,pursuant to the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 72-3 18(2).
Idaho Code 5 72-318(2) reads, "No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to
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compensation under this act shall be valid." As stated by the majority, the statute is intended to
prohibit an agreement that might [prospectively]limit an employee's @ture] rights to workers'
compensation benefits. This interpretation of the statute is supported by the Idaho Supreme
Court. See, Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005). The practical
application of this statute is evident upon review of virtually any lump sum agreement between
an employee and employer. Employee/employer agreements do not contain prospective language
limiting recovery in the event of a hture injury - even when the employee continues working for
the same employer post-injury. A simple reading of the statute reveals that it is not limited to
only an agreement between an employee and employer.
Although lump sum agreements are routinely used to resolve and dispose of claims for
benefits of present injuries, the language used in the present agreement not only resolves the
benefits due Claimant on the present injury, but also any and all future claims for benefits. The
problematic language in the Wemecke agreement reads as follows:
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the lump
sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be paid to Claimant by the Fund is in
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that Claimant may
now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of whatever
nature or kind for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care,
temporary disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and
all other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter makefor beneJits
against the Fund under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the State of
Idaho. This is the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's
damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now known or foreseen,
and regardless of whether the Claimant shall ever again injure herselfin
another orfiture accident, or suffer any disease which would arguable
cause the Fund to be liable for additional claims or benefits under the laws
of the State of Idaho. Acceptance of this agreement by the Claimant
according to the terms and conditions stated herein, shall fully and
completely discharge the Fund from liability from any claimsforever,
regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the
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subject of this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments,
disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafev arising.
(Emphases added.) Clearly, ISIF wanted to create an agreement by which Claimant waived her
rights to future compensation - a practice that is strictly prohibited by Idaho Code fi 72-318(2).
The assertion that the ISIF includes such language in nearly every lump sum settlement
agreement does not legitimize the process. "The Industrial Commission as 'an administrative
agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority granted to it by the Legislature
and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, or enlarge the legislative act
which it administers.' Accordingly, the Commission exercises only that discretion granted by the
Legislature." Simpson v. Louisiana-PaciJic Corp., 134 Idaho 209,212,998 P.2d 1122, 1125
(2000). The application of fi 72-318(2) to the language in ISIF lump sum agreements is a matter
of first impression. After thorough research, I was unable to find a case with similar facts and an
equivalent argument. Now that the ISIF's prospective language is being challenged, the
Commission is charged by the Legislature and directed by the Court to apply the facts of this case
to the law. If the statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as written. The majority's desire to
interpret the statute differently for public policy reasons is not permissible when the statute's
plain meaning is clear - any agreement by a claimant to waive his or her rights to workers'
compensation is invalid.
Assuming, arguendo, that ISIF could leap the initial hurdle posed by the plain meaning of
Idaho Code fi 72-318(2), the matter of ISIF's authority to enter into this agreement must be
addressed. Idaho Code fi 72-332(1) addresses the circumstances that must exist in order for a
claimant to be entitled to payment from the Industrial Special Indemnity account:

-
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If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin,
incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease arising out of and
in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both the
pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease.. .suffers
total and permanent disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of
compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational
disease.. .and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his
income benefits out of the industrial special indemnity account.
ISIF is not a surety. "ISJJ? was created to encourage employers to hire handicapped persons 'with
the obligation only to pay compensation for an industrial injury to the handicapped person such
amount as the employer would have had to pay an employee who had not been handicapped with
ISIF assuming responsibility for the balance of the total permanent disability.' " Tagg v.

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 123 Idaho 95,97,844 P.2d 1345, 1347 (1993) (internal
citations omitted). Therefore, it is axiomatic that ISF's lump sum agreements should not be
entered into as a means to unreasonably limit its liability. J S F should not be assessing whether it
is better to enter into a lump sum agreement with the claimant now because, in the future, he or
she might suffer an injury that puts ISIF on the hook for greater liability. That is, in fact, why
ISIF was created - to pay benefits to a claimant who suffers a work injury that combines with a
pre-existing condition that renders him or her totally and permanently disabled. Settling a case
prematurely (i.e. before there is some amount of evidence that the claimant is actually totally and
permanently disabled and unable to return to work) as a "business decision" does not follow the
intent for the creation and purpose of the ISIF.
Additionally, it is not irrelevant that ISIF did not concede total and permanent disability.
The majority would have you believe that a claimant's assertion of total and permanent disability
is adequate information for all parties, including the Commission, to proceed with the settlement.
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On the contrary, it is proper for the Commission "to consider the underlying merits of the
Claimants' [sic] claims when making its statutorily required determination as to whether the
settlement agreements were 'for the best interest of all parties.' Without some preliminary
inquiry into the merits of the claim, the Commission cannot properly judge whether an injured
worker is surrendering a strong claim for too small a settlement, or whether the ISIF is unwisely
satisfying spurious claims at great cost." Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129,

137, 106 P.3d 455,463 (2005). By this, the Idaho Supreme Court declared that the
Commission's approval of lump sum settlements was not simply a rubber stamp to the wishes
and assertions of the parties.
Moreover, the proposition that a void finding would impose a drastic handicap on ISIF
and claimants is overstated. The only situation that should give ISIF pause is one in which a
claimant's total and permanent disability status is so questionable that more than a mere chance
exists the claimant may return to work. Even then, the only event that could trigger additional
ISIF liability is another industrial accident that causes additional impairment and, again,
combines with the claimant's prior impairment - hardly a situation that would effect thousands
of settlements.
Of paramount importance is the understanding that this dissent's interpretation of Idaho
Code §§ 72-3 18(2) and 72-332(I) in no way opens the door for duplicate claims against the ISIF.
As long as a modicum of evidence exists that a claimant was totally and permanently disabled
and met the requirements of 3 72-332(1), and ISIF stipulated to the claimant's condition and its
liability in the prior agreement, a new claim against ISIF could be defended on the basis that the
claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to the new injury. A strong defense since the
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claimant and ISlF would have stipulated to total and permanent disability when settling the prior
dispute. "Collateral estoppel applies to issues that actually and necessarily have been decided in
prior litigation." Brown v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 138 Idaho 493,496,65 P.3d 515,
518 (2003). Therefore, not only is prospective language waiving a claimant's right to future
benefits in violation of 5 72-318(2), it is wholly unnecessary in curtailing ISlF's future liability.
Finally, it bears repeating that "the provisions of the Worker's [sic] Compensation Law
are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee." Spvague v. CaldweIZ Transp. Znc., 116
Idaho 720,721,779 P.2d 395,396 (1989). The humane purposes for which the law was
promulgated leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Id. ISlF's attempt to draft an
agreement within which Claimant waives future rights to workers' compensation benefits voids
the agreement. A void agreement renders ISIF's arguments in favor of a declaratory ruling moot.
Therefore, ISIF's motion for a declaratory ruling should be denied, and Claimant's claim against
ISIF should be allowed to proceed through the regular administrative hearing process.
For the above reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
Dated this

January, 2007.
WDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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) ICNO.:

PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE,

1
Claimant,

)

01-510641
03-515254
03-502068
03-521005

'

VS.

) SIF NO.: 200111425
)
200311850 1

SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT,
Employer,

)

Surety,
Defendant

1

200301596
200316212

'

/

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
)

In consideration of the premises, promises and covenants hereinafter set forth and subject
to the approval of the Agreement by the Industrial Commission, the parties hereto enter into the
following Lump Sum Agreement and request an order of the Commission discharging the
Defendants from liability pursuant to Section 72-404, Idaho Code.

m:The parties shall be designated herein as follows:
PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE is the Claimant herein and during all relevant
times was an employee of SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT, hereinafter referred to as
"Employer"; Employer was insured for its workers compensation liability by STATE
INSURANCE FUND, hereinafier referred to as "Surety". The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of
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the State of Idaho, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission", has the exclusive jurisdiction to
hear, determine and make the appropriate award and order in this matter.
SECOND: Claimant alleges that, on or about July 17,2001 while she was employed by
said Employer, she suffered an injury to her neck and left shoulder whiie in the course and scope
of her employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 49 years of age and manied.
Claimant worked 40 hours a week earning $8.00 per hour. Timely notice was given to the
Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act.
Claimant further alleges that, on or about October 8, 2002 while she was employed by

.

said Employer, she suffered an injury to her right shoulder while in the course and scope of her
employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 50 years of age and married. Claimant
A

worked 35 hours a week earning $8.26 per hour. Timely notice was given to the Employer and
Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act.
Claimant further alleges that, on or about January 10, 2003 while she was employed by
said Employer, she suffered an injury to her left fifth finger while in the course and scope of her
employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 50 years of age and married. Claimant
worked 35 hours a week earning $8.26 per hour. Timely notice was given to the Employer and
Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act.
Claimant further alleges that, on or about September 26, 2003 while she was employed
by said Employer, she suffered an injury to her right shoulder while in the course and scope of
her employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 51 years of age and married.
Claimant worked 35 hours a week earning $8.26 per hour. Timely notice was given to the
Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act.
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m:As will appear &om the medical reports following her July 17, 2001 accident,
Claimant was primarily treated by Benewah Community Hospital and St. Maries Family
Medicine for cervical and left shoulder strain.
As will appear &om the medical reports following her October 8, 2002 and September
26, 2003 accidents, Claimant was primarily treated by Steven Pennington, M.D. for subacromial
impingement and a rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder. On June 20, 2003, Dr. Pennington
performed subacromial decompression and rotator cuff repair. Claimant suffered a recurrent
rotator cuff tear and on January 8,2004, Dr. Pennington performed debridement and rotator cuff
repair. On July 6,2004, Dr. Pennington found Claimant was at maximum medical improvement.
On September 9, 2004, Claimant was evaluated by Carl Brunjes, M.D. at the request of the
Surety. Dr. Brunjes found Claimant had sustained a 7% permanent partial impairment of the
upper extremity. Claimant subsequently returned to Dr. Pennington with complaints of recurrent
right shoulder pain. Dr. Pennington referred Claimant to Edwin Tingstad, M.D. for evaluation
and treatment. Dr. Tingstad diagnosed biceps tendon instability with subscapularis tear. On April
2, 2005, Claimant was evaluated by Eugene Toomey, M.D. at the request of the Surety. Dr.
Toomey diagnosed adhesive capsulitis and preexisting acromioclavicular arthritis. Dr. Toomey
found Claimant had sustained no additional permanent partial impairment.
As will appear from the medical reports following her January 10, 2003 accident,
Claimant was primarily treated at St. Maries Family Medicine for fracture of the left fifth finger.
FOURTH: The Employer and Surety have paid Claimant the following medical benefits:
DO1 7/17/01
Doctors
St. Maries Family Medicine
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Hospitals
Benewah Community Hospital
Phvsical Theraoy
Benewah Community Hospital
Mileage
Claimant Reimbursement
Miscellaneous
Benewah Community Hospital
Edward Van Vooren, M.D.
Jack's Pharmacy
Total Medical Paid to Date:

Doctors
Charles Jacobson, M.D.
Steven Pennington, M.D.
Edwin Tingstad,
M.D.
OMAC
Hospitals
Gritman Medical Center
Physical Therapy
Benewah Community Hospital
Gritman Medical Center
Kootenai Medical Center
Mileage
Claimant Reimbursement
Miscellaneous
Radiology Consultants Gritman
Harbor Xnesthesia Services
Gritman Medical Center
Steven Pennington, M.D.
Edwin Tingstad, M.D.
Jack's Pharmacy
Marketime Drug
Total Medical Paid to Date:

LUMP SUM AGREEMENT Page 4

Claimant agrees to allow Surety to provide to the Commission any medical records reasonably
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement.
FIFTH: There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the parties as
to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need for retraining benefits and
the need for future medical benefits. The parties, however, wish to settle their differences on a
full and final basis advising the Commission that it is in the best interests of the parties to do so.
Therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 72-404, in an effort to settle this disputed matter,
the Surety tenders to the Claimant and the Claimant accepts the sum of $56,284.70 in full and
final settlement of any and all claims she has or may have as a result of any of the alleged
injuries described herein. Further, the parties agree to waive any underpayment of total
temporary disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits which may exist for any
reason, including any underpayments that may exist as a result of the method used to calculate
the compensation rate(s).
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT THE
CLAIMANT AGREES TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS NOT LISTED TN
THE FOURTH SECTION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYER AND SURETY
WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR, NOR DO THEY ASSUME LIABILITY FOR, ANY
OTHER MEDICAL BILLS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SAID LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
SHALL BE APPORTIONED AS FOLLOWS:
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
Total Temvorarv Disability Benefits
DO1 711 7101
711 7/01 through 8/05/01
2 weeks, 6 days at $222.75 per week
TOTAL DUE
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT Page 5

DO1 10/08/02
6/20/03 through 8117/03
8 weeks, 3 days at $237.15 per week
10/07/03 through 12131/03
12 weeks, 2 days at $237.15 per week
1101/04 through 7/06/04
26 weeks, 6 days at $240.30 per week
10111/04 through 11/10/04
4 weeks, 3 days at $240.30 per week
11111/04 through 12/31/04
7 weeks, 2 days at $240.30 per week
1/01/05 through 3/24/05
11 weeks, 6 days at $244.35 per week
TOTAL DUE
Temporaw Partial Disabilitv Benefits
Retraining Benefits
Permanent Partial Impairment
DO1 10/08/02
7% upper extremity at 2 1
weeks at $289.30 per week
TOTAL DUE
Future Medical Benefits
Unav~ortionedDisvuted
Impairment and Additional
Disabilitv Benefits at 36%
whole person at 180 weeks
at $289.30 per week
In consideration for this Lump
Sum Agreement vursuant to
Idaho Code Section 72-404,
waiver of rie;ht of apveal,
waiver of right of
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reconsideration. waiver
of ri&t of modification

Less TTD previously paid
DO1 7/17/01
DO1 10/08/02
Less TPD previously paid
Less Retraining oaid
Less PPI previzsly paid
DO1 10108102
Less LSS advance paid

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS:
A. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS
B. Costs taken prior to LSS
C. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS
D. Additional costs to be taken from LSS
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS TO
BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider and amounts.)

E.

Total of Outstanding Medicals
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT
(Subtract Lines C & D relating
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none

to attorney fees, and Line E
relating to outstanding medicals,
from the total amount due
Claimant of this LSS)
The parties acknowledge and agree that, of the $56,284.70 lump sum money represented
by this Agreement, the sum of $3,000.00 is allocated to consideration of settlement and waiver of
right to reconsideration and appeal. The parties further acknowledge and agree that the lump sum
to be paid to Claimant under the terms of this Agreement is compensation for disability which
will affect Claimant for the rest of her life. Claimant's remaining life expectancy is 328 months
(Period Life Table 2002, updated June 2006). Therefore, even though paid in a lump sum,
Claimant's net benefits afier deduction of attorney fees ($14,071.00), settlement consideration
($3,000.00), and litigation costs ($339.98), shall be considered to be $118.51 for 328 months,
beginning August 1,2007.

m: The parties advise the Commission that they believe that it is in their best
interests that this disputed matter be settled as herein set forth.
The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of the temporary disability and
permanent partial disability and medical and related expenses in this matter are uncertain and
may be continuing or progressive and may substantially exceed those hereinabove set forth, and
the above shall not limit the scope of this Agreement or the Order of Discharge entered by the
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and claims to all
permanent and temporary disability benefits, all impairment benefits and all medical and related
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the parties.
The Claimant does agree to indemnifl, defend and hold Defendants harmless from and
against any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to the said alleged
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accident, and any resultant losses, damages or injuries, including without limit, any claim
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expenses.
SEVENTH: The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that she has carefully read this
instrument in its entirety and has been fully advised regarding the contents of this Agreement by
her counsel, that Claimant understands its contents and has signed same knowing that the
payment forever concludes, settles and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and
nature and character that she now has or may have individuaIIy against Employer and Surety on
account of the alleged injuries and that these proceedings are concluded and forever discharged
and that they may be dismissed with prejudice by reason hereof, subject only to the
Commission's order and approval.
Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08033, a memorandum from Claimant's counsel accompanies
this Agreement setting forth the required information regarding Claimant's attorney's fees.
EIGHTH: Upon the Commission's order approving this Agreement and subject to the
payment of $56,284.70, the balance due Claimant, the Employer and Surety shall be discharged
and released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-described accidents and
injuries.
DATED this

day of

,2007.

PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE
Claimant

Attorney for Claimant
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Assistant ~un&k&a~er, State Insurance
/?
Fund

r

State In u
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hool District 41 Joint, and Surety,
ce Fund.

ORDER
Upon the foregoing and good cause appearing and the Industrial Commission being fully
advised and having determined that it is for the best interests of the parties that the liability of the
Employer and Surety be discharged in whole by the payment of the Lump Sum Agreement as
provided therein, NOW THEREFORE:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lump Sum Agreement be and it hereby is approved
as provided by Section 72-404 Idaho Code, and that the above-entitled proceedings are dismissed
with prejudice and the Employer, School District 41 Joint, and the Surety, are discharged and
released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-entitled injuries.
DATED:

v

n?
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

COMMISSIONER
BY
COMMISSIONER

ASSISTANT SE
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State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720
(208) 332-2100

--

3
c
m

5%

53

"
E x 23
c

Attorney for Defendants School District 41 Joint and State Insurance Fund

1z
rn

0-

FJ

o

g4

2s: -0

) ICNO.:
\

PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE,
Claimant,

01-510241
03-5 15254
03-502068
03-521005

)
) SIFNO.: 200111425

VS.

SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT,
Employer,

1
1
1

2003 11850
200301596
200316212

) STIPULATION & ORDER
) FOR DISMISSAL
) WITH PREJUDICE

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendant

)

COMES NOW, the Claimant, PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE, by and through
her attorney of record, Charles L. Graham, and the Defendants, SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT
and the STATE INSURANCE FUND, by and through their attorney of record, David J. Lee, and
stipulate and agree that the above-numbered cause has been settled and, subject only to the
payment of the sums ordered in the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge, the abovestyled and numbered cause may be dismissed with prejudice.
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DATED this

Xbfi

,2007.

day of

ug&b,
l4

'i4L.L
CHARLES L. GRAHAM
Attorney for Claimant

,

P

int and Surety,

State Insura e Fund

-

ORDER

Pursuant to the above and foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above styled and numbered cause be dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED:

4 4 3 67
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
a true and correct copy of LUMP SUM
I hereby certify that on AU6 1 0 2001
AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR DISMISSAL WITH
PREXJDICE, IC #03-515254, was served by the method indicated below upon each of
the following:

r>c

,Mail

CHARLES L GRAHAM ESQ
PO BOX 9344
MOSCOW ID 83843

State Insurance Fund
1215 West State Street
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720-0044

Courier

HAND DELIVERED

CHARLES L. GRAHAM
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellant
P.O. Box 9344
414 S. Jefferson
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Idaho Bar No. 3839
BEFORE T m INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO
PATSY WERNECKE,
ClaimantiAppellant,

1
)
)
)

1

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
DefendantlRespondent.

)
)

LC. 15-000083
(03-5 15254)
NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
1
1
\

TO: Respondent, State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund and its attorney, Kenneth L.
Mallea, Mallea Law Offices, P.0. Box 857, Meridian, ID 83680; and the Clerk of the Idaho
industrial Commission:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. Appellant, Patsy Wernecke, appeals against the Respondent, State of Idaho Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho Industrial
Commission's interlocutory Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, entered in the aboveentitled proceeding on January 19,2007, Chairman James F. Kile presiding. The Industrial

NOTICE OF APPEAL-I

Commission's final Order for Dismissal With Prejudice was entered in this proceeding on
August 9,2007.
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order on Petition
for Declaratory Ruling described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rules 1l(d) and 14(b).
3. The issues Appellant intends to assert in this appeal are:
(a) Whether the Industrial Commission correctly determined that Ms. Wernecke's
claim against the ISIF is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver, and
quasi-estoppel;
(b) Whether the 1994 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) between Ms.

Wernecke and ISIF is void under Idaho Code 5 72-3 18(2) because it is an agreement by an
employee, Ms. Wernecke, to waive her rights to compensation under the Worker's
Compensation Act; and
(c) Whether ISIF has the authority to enter into agreements with claimants settling
claims where ISIF denies that it is liable for total and permanent disability.
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.
5. No transcript is requested.

6. Appellant requests no documents be included in the agency's record other than those
automatically included under I.A.R. 28.
7. I certify:
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Idaho Industrial Commission's
record has been paid.
(b) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
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(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

DATED THIS

&yL\day of August, 2007.
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.

[bk<

By:

L .. L

L

C arles L. Graham
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

6

h

day of August, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the
manner indicated below:
Kenneth L. Mallea
Mallea Law Offices
PO Box 857
Meridian ID 83680

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail
[
I Fax
[
] Hand Delivery

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
Department of Administration
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-7901

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail

1

[

] Hand Delivery

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[
] Overnight Mail

Clerk, Idaho Industrial Commission
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720

I

[

.I-

k

Charles L. Graham
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I Fax

I Fax

] Hand Delivery

L
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PATSY WERNECKE,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.

/
S E a

1
)

)

SUPREME COURT NO.

1
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT #041,
Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,

. I C " J

+

f

3 q539

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
)

Defendants,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

1
3

Defendant-Respon+k._,.-

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
James F. Kile, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 15-000083 (03-5 15254)

Order Appealed from:

Order on Petition for Declaratory
Ruling, filed January 19,2007.

Attorney for Appellant:

Charles L. Graham
Po Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843

Attorney for Respondent:

Kenneth L. Mallea
PO Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680

Appealed By:

Claimant/Appellant

Appealed Against:

DefendanVRespondent

Notice of Appeal Filed:

August 30,2007

Appellate Fee Paid:

Incorrectly made out to
Clerk of the Idaho Industrial
Commission - returned to
Appellant on August 3 1,2007

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR WERNECKE - 1

SEP . 4 2007

Name of Reporter:

Joan Marshall, C.S.R.
M&M Court Reporting Services, Inc.
816 Sherman Avenue #7
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been prepared and filed with the Commission.

Dated:

-

CERTJFICATE OF APPEAL FOR WERNECKE 2

CERTIFICATION

I, Carol J. Haight, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the hdustrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal, filed August 30,2007; Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
filed January 19,2007; and the whole thereof, in IC # 15-000083(03-515254) for Patsy Wemecke.

INWITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of said
Commission this

2czr
day of

-2007.

CERTImCATlON OF RECORD
I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission, do hereby certify
that thc foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and papers
designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by Rule28(3) of the Idaho
Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are
correctly listed in the Certificate of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme
Court upon settlement of the Record herein.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 1st day of November, 2007.
INDUSTRW; COMMISSION

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - 1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATSY WRNECKE,
ClaimantIAppellant,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTWL
SPECIAL N E M N I T Y FUND,
DefendantIRespondent.

1
1

) SUPREME COURT NO. 34539

)
)
) NOTICE OF COMPLETION

1
1
1
\

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS;
AND CHARJ.,ES L. GRAHAM, ESQ. FOR CLAIMANT PATSY WERNECKE;
AND KENNETH L. MALLEA, ESQ. FOR DEFlENDANT STATE OF IDAHO,
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date,
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Charles L. Graham
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843

Kenneth L. Mallea
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680

You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules,
all parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the
Record, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to
the Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be
deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 1st day of November, 2007.

Assistant Commission Secretary
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - I

